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INTRODUCTION
In the United States, the financial crisis prompted
unprecedented government bailouts for banks, mortgage servicers,
the insurance giant American International Group, and
automotive makers General Motors and Chrysler.' The U.S.
economy shifted to financial services and products, and more
behavioral regulation is underway for financial institutions
deemed too-big-and-integral-to-fail. Federal regulators were
incapable of addressing the abuses leading up to the financial
crisis, unaware initially of the scope of the crisis, and inept in
their initial response. 2 This is especially troubling when the U.S.
Supreme Court, of late, appears more comfortable with the
antitrust function being subsumed in the regulatory framework. 3
1 Bailout Recipients, PROPUBLICA, http:/Ibailout.propublica.org/main/listlindex
(last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
2 See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING
OF THE WORLD ECONOMY (2010).
3 Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1124 (2009)
(Breyer, J., concurring) ("When a regulatory structure exists to deter and remedy
anticompetitive harm, the costs of antitrust enforcement are likely to be greater than
the benefits."); Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 280-81 (2007); Verizon
Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 414-15 (2004); see also
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Although one can distinguish the financial services industry
from other industries, the crisis raised important issues of market
failure, weak regulation, the lack of understanding of systemic
risk in financial markets, and moral hazard. Policymakers are
now re-examining fundamental issues, such as the efficiency of
marketS4 and the role of legal, social, and ethical norms in a
market economy. 5 The financial crisis has also prompted calls for
reinvigorating antitrust enforcement in the United States,
toughening antitrust's legal standardS6 and breaking up firms
deemed too-big-and-integral-to-fail. 7
In reconsidering their antitrust policies, policymakers should
return to first principles. Antitrust policy is built on a flawed
assumption of rationality. As a result, antitrust provides an
incomplete, and at times incorrect, account of competition. For the

Edward D. Cavanagh, The Private Antitrust Remedy: Lessons From The American
Experience, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 629, 636 (2010); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley,
Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87 TEX. L. REV. 685 (2009).
A. Varney, Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S.
4 See Christine
Dep't of Justice, Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement In This Challenging Era, Remarks at
the United States Chamber of Commerce (May 12, 2009), available at
that
(rejecting assumption
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/245777.htm
markets are generally self-policing and self-correcting); see also J. Thomas Rosch,
Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Managing Irrationality: Some Observations on
Behavioral Economics and the Creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Agency,
Remarks at the Conference on the Regulation of Consumer Financial Products (Jan. 6,
2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/100106financial-products.pdf.
5 See, e.g., GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: How
HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL
CAPITALISM 26 (2009); ROBERT SKIDELSKY, KEYNES: THE RETURN OF THE MASTER 189
(2009); John Authers, Wanted: New Model for Markets, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, at 9;
Rana Foroohar, May the Best Theory Win: How Economists Are Competing To Make
Sense Of Our Failed FinancialSystem, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 1, 2010, at 42-44 (discussing
annual meeting of American Economic Association); Paul Krugman, How Did
Economists Get It So Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2009, at 36; Gillian Tett, The
Emotional Markets Hypothesis and Greek Bonds, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2010, at 7;
STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at 238-74.
6 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Withdraws Report
On Antitrust Monopoly Law: Antitrust Division to Apply More Rigorous Standard With
Focus on the Impact of Exclusionary Conduct on Consumers (May 11, 2009), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2009/245710.htm.
7 See, e.g., SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KwAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET
TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 208-22 (2010).
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past thirty years, the Chicago, 8 post-Chicago, 9 and to the extent
distinguishable, Harvard Schools10 have debated over antitrust's
legal standards. But all three schools assume a marketplace of
rational" profit-maximizing firms and consumers with perfect
willpower.' 2 Therein lies the problem.
For meaningful change after the financial crisis, competition
policymakers must reconsider three fundamental interrelated
questions: First, what is competition? Second, what are the goals
of the competition laws? Third, what legal standards should be
used to promote these goals?
This article addresses the first question-what is
competition?13 The question seems so basic that it need not be
asked. But as Part I discusses, no satisfactory definition of
competition exists. Some consider competition as an idealized endstate (such as static price competition under the economic model
of perfect competition). Others view competition as a dynamic
process.
Part II explores one reason why multiple definitions of
competition remain. Any theory of competition depends on its
8 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001); ROBERT H. BORK,
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978).
9 See, e.g., 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 113, at 134 (2d ed. 2000)
("[B]usiness firms are (or must be assumed to be) profit-maximizers."); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Post-ChicagoAntitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
258 (2001); Symposium, Post-ChicagoEconomics, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 445 (1995).
10 See William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law
for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/HarvardDouble Helix, 2007 COLUM. Bus. L.
REV. 1 (2007) (summarizing contributions of Harvard School to modern antitrust
analysis).
11 Rationality under neoclassical economic theory has a narrow meaningindividuals are objective, seek out the optimal amount of information, readily and
continually update their prior factual beliefs with relevant and reliable empirical data,
and choose, after conducting a cost-benefit analysis, the best action according to stable,
well-defined preferences. Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives:
Behavioral Economics and the Case for 'Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L. REV.
1211, 1214-15 (2003). Rationality, as discussed herein, does not encompass its other
meanings, such as being fair, pragmatic, thoughtful, compassionate, or virtuous. Id.
12 Humans with perfect willpower take actions that are consistent with their own
long-term interests.
13 I discuss the second issue in Reconsidering Antitrust's Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2012), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=1904686.
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premises, the validity of which may not hold true across
industries, countries, and time. Using recent developments in
behavioral economics, Part II varies one premise of competitionthe relative rationality of market firms and consumers. As the
behavioral economic literature has shown over the past thirty
years, and the recent financial crisis bore out, consumers and
firms do not always behave rationally. Relaxing the assumption of
rational firms and consumers yields four scenarios of competition.
Part III analyzes each scenario of competition and its policy
implications. When one relaxes the assumption of rational firms
and consumers, one's theory of competition extends beyond the
current focus on static price competition in narrowly defined
markets. Issues of systemic risk, behavioral exploitation, herding
behavior, overconfidence bias, the importance of maintaining trialand-error feedback loops, consumer choice, and competitive
diversity all increase in importance. Part III examines the
antitrust policy implications for each scenario of competition-if
the government is relatively more or less rational than market
participants. This article introduces several important challenges
facing competition policy and provides several mechanisms for
competition agencies to improve their policies.
I. DEFINING COMPETITION

A. Common Definitions of Competition
One popular antitrust treatise states, "Today it seems clear
that the general goal of the antitrust laws is to promote
'competition' as the economist understands that term."' 4 One
problem, the treatise recognizes, is that economists can have a
different conception of competition than lawyers and laypersons.' 5
Another problem is that economists have not reached consensus in
defining competition.

14 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, at 4; see also AM. BAR Ass'N SECTION OF
ANTITRUST LAW, REPORT ON ANTITRUST POLICY OBJECTIVES (Feb. 12, 2003), available

at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abaladministrative/antitrust_1aw/report
policyobjectives.authcheckdam.pdf.
15 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, at 3.
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The United States' Sherman Antitrust Act was enacted over
a century ago.16 But antitrust law, Robert Bork observed, "has not
arrived at one satisfactory definition of 'competition."' 17 This is
surprising, considering the concept of competition is central to
competition policy and economic thinking in general. Competition
law focuses on anti-competitive restraints,' 8 and one oft-described
goal is to ensure an effective competitive process.19 Yet the
concept of competition, as economist John Vickers said, "has taken
on a number of interpretations and meanings, many of them
vague." 20 Others agree. 2 1 Most jurisdictions "maintain that their
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006).
BORK, supra note 8, at 61 (1978).
18 See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 898-99
(2007) (noting how courts can "devise rules over time for offering proof, or even
presumptions where justified, to make the rule of reason a fair and efficient way to
prohibit anticompetitive restraints and to promote procompetitive ones").
16
17

19 INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK: UNILATERAL CONDUCT WORKING GRP., REPORT ON
THE
OBJECTIVES
OF
UNILATERAL
CONDUCT
LAWS,
ASSESSMENT
OF
DOMINANCE/SUBSTANTIAL MARKET POWER, AND STATE-CREATED MONOPOLIES 6 (2007)

[hereinafter 2007 ICN REPORT], available at http://www.internationalcompetition
network.org/uploads/library/doc353.pdf.
20 John Vickers, Concepts of Competition, 47 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 1, 3 (1995).
21 United States v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 231 F. Supp. 95, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1964)
("There is no one definition of competition. Economists do not agree over the meaning
of the term nor do they agree how it can be achieved."); STANLEY N. BARNES ET AL., THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 318

(1955) ("The idea of competition itself ... is not so easy to define."); Michael E. Porter,
Building the Microeconomic Foundations of Prosperity: Findings from the Business
Competitive Index 2004, in UNIQUE VALUE: COMPETITION BASED ON INNOVATION
CREATING UNIQUE VALUE FOR ANTITRUST, THE ECONOMY, HEALTHCARE, EDUCATION
AND BEYOND 64 (Charles D. Weller ed., 2004) (competitiveness "remains a concept that
is not well understood, despite widespread acceptance of its importance"); WORLD
BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002: BUILDING INSTITUTIONS FOR MARKETS 140

(2002), available at http://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64165259
&theSitePK=469372&piPK=64165421&menuPK=64166093&entitylD=000094946_010
92204010635 (finding in its survey of fifty countries' competition laws, "that different
conceptions of competition exist across countries"); Jay B. Barney, Types of Competition
and the Theory of Strategy: Toward an Integrative Framework, 11 ACAD. MGMT. REV.
791, 798 (1986) ("Competition . . . is a concept that can mean different things at
different times to different firms."); Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Maintaining Economic
Competition: the Causes and Consequences of Antitrust, 41 J. POL. 169, 171 (1979)
(noting "the lack, among economists, of a generally accepted definition of competition");
Paul J. McNulty, Economic Theory and the Meaning of Competition, 82 Q.J. ECON. 639,
639 (1968) ("There is probably no concept in all of economics that is at once more
fundamental and pervasive, yet less satisfactorily developed, than the concept of
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competition laws 'preserve competition,"' observed the American
Bar Association, but preserving competition "does not always
mean the same thing in different jurisdictions and is sometimes
only one of several objectives pursued under a country's antitrust
law." 2 2 The Chilean Competition Tribunal, for example, said, "the
only objective of competition policy is to promote and protect
competition," but then recognized that "one of the main difficulties
is to define legally what 'free competition means,' or to articulate
why competition itself should be protected." 23
Some view competition in its natural setting-as a cutthroat
fight over scarce resources. 24 But within animal ecology, genetics,
and evolution, the term competition has multiple meanings. 25
Antitrust policy, of course, does not encourage market participants
in seeking scarce resources to maim or kill others. 26 Competition
should not increase society's mortality rate. 27 Even within the
animal kingdom, competition for scarce resources is not a

competition."); Donghyun Park, The Meaning of Competition: A GraphicalExposition,
29 J. ECON. EDUC. 347, 356 (1998) ("[C]ompetition has become one of the most
ambiguous concepts in economics."); George J. Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically
Contemplated, 65 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1957) (noting that the concept of competition was
long treated with casualness); Neri Salvadori & Rodolfo Signorino, The Classical
Notion of Competition Revisited 2 (MPRA Paper No. 22499 May 3, 2010), available at
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22499/1/MPRA _paper_22499.pdf (noting that few
would disagree with Vickers' statement).
22 AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 14, at 3.
23 2007 ICN REPORT, supra note 19, at 8. The report went on to state:
In 2004, when the [Chilean Competition] Act was amended, the executive and
legislative powers discussed whether 'free competition' should be defined
more narrowly as a right to participate in economic activities, a means of
promoting economic efficiency, or a means of enhancing consumer welfare.
The legislators [as reported by the ICNI decided that the meaning of 'free
competition,' that is, an effective competitive process, should be left to the
Tribunal's interpretation, on a case-by-case basis.
Id.
24 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Cigarettes Cheaper!, 462 F.3d 690 (7th Cir.
2006) (noting that 'cutthroat competition' is a term of praise rather than
condemnation" and consumers gain when firms try to "kill" the competition and take as
much business as they can).
25 See L.C. Birch, The Meanings of Competition, 91 AM. NATURALIST 5, 6 (1957).
26 Id. at 6.
27 Id.
at 9.
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prerequisite for "survival of the fittest," the natural selection of
species.28
Many view competition as rivalry: "the effort of two or more
parties acting independently to secure the business of a third
party by offering the most favorable terms."29 Several courts
applied similar definitions, such as the "effort of two or more
parties, acting independently, to secure the custom of a third
party by the offer of the most favorable terms.

. .

. [t]he struggle

between rivals for the same trade at the same time";3 0 and the
"independent endeavor of two or more persons or organizations
within the realm of a chosen market place, to obtain the business
patronage of others by means of various appeals, including the
offer of more attractive terms or superior merchandise." 3 '
Others question this characterization. Increasing the number
of rivals does not necessarily increase, and can diminish,
incentives to compete. 32 "An economist sees competition not in
terms of rivalry per se, but in terms of market performance," said
a former Department of Justice official, 33 further stating:
An economist would say that a market is perfectly
competitive when firms price their output at marginal cost
and costs are minimized by internal efficiency. This does not
necessarily require a large number of rivals. Where entry and

28

Id. at 13.

http://www.merriam-webster
.com/dictionary/competition (last visited Nov. 1, 2011); BARNES ET AL., supra note 21, at
318 (one conception of competition is "the self-interested and independent rivalry of
two or more private competitors").
30 Lipson v. Socony Vacuum Corp., 87 F.2d 265, 270 (1st Cir. 1937) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
31 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 91 F. Supp. 333, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); see
also New Eng. Theatres, Inc. v. Lausier, 86 F. Supp. 852, 856 (D. Me. 1949); United
States v. Sutherland, 9 F. Supp. 204, 205 (W.D. Mo. 1934).
32 See Avishalom Tor & Stephen M. Garcia, The N-Effect: Beyond Winning
748 (2010),
available at http://wwwProbabilities, 21
PsYCHOL. SCl.
personal.umich.edu/-smgarcialpubs/then-effect reply.pdf.
33 William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Att'y General, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, What Is Competition?, Address Before the Seminar on Convergence (Oct. 28,
2002), availableat http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/200440.htm#N 7.
29 Competition Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM,
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exit are costless, markets can be perfectly competitive even
with only one firm serving the entire market. 34
The official characterized competition as "the process by which
market forces operate freely to assure that society's scarce
resources are employed as efficiently as possible to maximize total
economic welfare."3 5
Competition, like athletic contests, 36 is not always zero-sum.
It involves cooperation through voluntary endeavors among
suppliers, wholesalers, retailers, and consumers. One can view
competition as the voluntary process society elects to resolve
conflicts of interest among its members.3 7
Competition can be vertical among firms in the distribution
chain. Manufacturers often have a complementary and
competitive relationship with firms from whom they buy and to
whom they sell.38 Not surprisingly, two of Professor Michael
Porter's famous five competitive forces that impact a company's
profits are vertical: (i) powerful customers seeking to "capture
more value by forcing down prices, demanding better quality or
more service (thereby driving up costs), and generally playing
industry participants off against one another, all at the expense of
industry profitability"; and (ii) "powerful suppliers" seeking to
"capture more of the value for themselves by charging higher
prices, limiting quality or services, or shifting costs to industry
participants."3 9
a Id.
3s Id.
36

See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).

37

See ARMEN A. ALCHIAN, ECONOMIC FORCES AT WORK 127 (1977).

38

Robert L. Steiner, Market Power in Consumer Goods Industries, in PRIVATE

LABELS, BRANDS, AND COMPETITION POLICY: THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF RETAIL

COMPETITION 73 (Ariel Ezrachi & Ulf Bernitz eds., 2009); Guidelines on the
Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under the Council Regulation on the Control of
64 [hereinafter Assessment
Concentrations Between Undertakings, 2004 O.J. (C 31)
http://eur-lex.europa.eulLexUriServ/
available at
Mergers],
Horizontal
of
competitive
("The
LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52004XCO205%2802%29:EN:NOT
pressure on a supplier is not only exercised by competitors but can also come from its
customers.").
39 Michael E. Porter, The Five Competitive Forces That Shape Strategy, HARV. Bus.
REV., Jan. 2008, at 29-30; see also Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir.
2000).
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Competition is also normative.40 What we observe-as
competition reflects, in part-are the legal constraints and
incentives as well as informal social, ethical, and moral norms.4 '
Societies distinguish between "competition on the merits" and
unfair methods of competition. 42 Those terms, subject to different
interpretations, 4 3 imply that competition can be good or bad,
based on society's "generalized standards of fairness and social
utility."4 4 Market participants, through the legislature, industry
codes, and informal norms, set the rules and punishments. At
times, competition is considered "ruinous" or "cutthroat." 45 At
times, competition with foreign firms is criticized as "structurally
and qualitatively unequal." 46 At other times, competition is
curtailed to promote other societal goals. 47

40

See Xiaoye Wang, The New Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law: A Survey of a Work in

Progress, 54 ANTITRUST BULL. 579, 580 (2009) (observing how China until the late

1970s viewed the term competition pejoratively "as a capitalist monster").
41

See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE

60, 123 (2005).

42 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2006) (prohibiting "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
or affecting commerce"); Commission Regulation 864/2007, art. 6, 2007 O.J. (L 199/40)
(EC) (discussing unfair competition and acts restricting free competition); Free Trade
Agreement Between the European Union and its Member States and the Republic of
Korea, 2011 O.J. (L127/6); FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972)
("[]nfair competitive practices were not limited to those likely to have anticompetitive
consequences after the manner of the antitrust laws; nor were unfair practices in
commerce confined to purely competitive behavior.").
43 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, What is
Competition on the Merits?, POL'Y BRIEF, June 2006, at 1, available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/27/37082099.pdf (noting that "expression competition
on the merits" has "never been satisfactorily defined," which has "led to a discordant
body of case law that uses an assortment of analytical methods," which in turn "has
produced unpredictable results and undermined the term's legitimacy along with
policies that are supposedly based on it").
4

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION

§ 1,

at 9 (1993).

See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Cut-Throat
Competition, GLOSSARY OF STATISTICAL TERMS, http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/
detail.asp?ID=3186 (last visited Nov. 1, 2011) (Cut-throat competition "refers to
situations when competition results in prices that do not chronically or for extended
periods of time cover costs of production, particularly fixed costs. This may arise in
secularly declining or 'sick' industries with high levels of excess capacity or where
frequent cyclical or random demand downturns are experienced.").
45

46

JAMES KYNGE, CHINA SHAKES

FUTURE-AND

THE CHALLENGE

THE WORLD: A TITAN'S RISE AND TROUBLED
109 (2007) (concerns over China's

FOR AMERICA
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Nor is competition always desirable. Status competition
(including competing over conspicuous consumption) can increase
envy and misery. 4 8 As economist Richard Layard observed, "We do
want the maximum of competition between firms, but not between
individuals. We want a lot of cooperation between individuals, for
one reason above all-that life is more enjoyable that way."4 9
When referring positively to competition, policymakers often
cite its effects, such as "low prices, high quality products, a wide
selection of goods and services, and innovation."5 0 But the effects
do not define competition itself and are sometimes inconsistent.
Higher prices and reduced output, remarked the Supreme Court,
are "the paradigmatic examples of restraints of trade that the
Sherman Act was intended to prohibit."5 1 But a divided Court
recently recognized that vertical restraints that lead to higher
prices can nonetheless be pro-competitive. 52 Manufacturers today
can prevent retailers-through resale price maintenance-from
discounting their goods. At times, increased price competition (for

currency being undervalued, and keeping costs artificially low with poor safety,
environmental and worker standards, and by subsidizing energy and water).
47 See United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 301 (1945)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) ('If a State for its own sufficient reasons deems it a
desirable policy to standardize the price of liquor within its borders either by a direct
price-fixing statute or by permissive sanction of such price-fixing in order to discourage
the temptations of cheap liquor due to cutthroat competition, the Twenty-first
Amendment gives it that power and the Commerce Clause does not gainsay it.").
48

See Maurice E. Stucke, Money, Is That What I Want? Competition Policy and the

Role of Behavioral Economics, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 893 (2010).
49

Richard Layard, Happiness and Public Policy: A Challenge to the Profession, 116

ECON. J. C24, C31 (2006).
50 Assessment of Horizontal Mergers, supra note 38; see also N. Pac. Ry. Co. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) ("[U]nrestrained interaction of competitive forces
will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest
quality and the greatest material progress . . . ."); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT AND THE CONSUMER 1 (1996), available at http://publications.usa.gov/
USAPubs.php?PubID=5195 ("Free and open competition benefits consumers by
ensuring lower prices and new and better products."); FED. TRADE COMM'N,
COMPETITION COUNTS: How CONSUMERS WIN WHEN BUSINESSES COMPETE (Mar. 2007),

at
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/edulpubs/consumer/general/zgen01.shtm
available
("Competition in America is about price, selection, and service. It benefits consumers
by keeping prices low and the quality and choice of goods and services high.").
51 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 107-08 (1984).
52 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
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example, intra-brand competition53 ) leads to more free-riding,
fewer services and innovation, and ultimately fewer choices and
firms.54 At times, greater innovation comes from excluding
competitors from making, using, or selling the product at a lower
price.55

B. Perfect vs. Dynamic Competition
Within antitrust, two popular theories of competition are as:
(i) an ideal end-state (perfect competition), and (ii) a process
(dynamic competition).56 Perfect competition, according to some, is
"the most competitive market imaginable in which everybody is a
price-taker."5 7 In the "perfectly competitive" market, "buyers and
sellers are so numerous and well informed that each can act as a
price-taker, able to buy or sell any desired quantity without

53 See Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). A vertical nonprice restraint can potentially and simultaneously reduce "intra-brand competition"
(e.g., competition among Sylvania dealers for Sylvania television sets) and stimulate
inter-brand competition (e.g., competition among different manufacturers of television
sets, such as Zenith or RCA).
54 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 551 U.S. at 890-91; Louis D. Brandeis, Price
and Competition, in THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC VIEWS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 398
(1930) (observing how "[u]nrestricted competition ... leads to monopoly"); see also U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 34 (Apr.
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.htm
available
at
2007),
(discussing "a winner-take-all standards war," in which "firms vigorously compete . . .
to establish their technology as the de facto standard"); Peter 0. Steiner, Program
Patterns and Preferences, and the Workability Competition in Radio Broadcasting, 66
Q.J. ECON. 194, 212-17 (1952).
55 See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) ("The balance between the
interest in motivating innovation and enlightenment by rewarding invention with
patent protection on the one hand, and the interest in avoiding monopolies that
unnecessarily stifle competition on the other, has been a feature of the federal patent
laws since their inception."); H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 7 (1909) (copyright law
considers "how much the monopoly granted [would] be detrimental to the public . . .
[as] the granting of such exclusive rights, under the proper terms and conditions,
confers a benefit upon the public that outweighs the evils of the temporary monopoly").
56 Mark Blaug, Is Competition Such a Good Thing? Static Efficiency Versus
Dynamic Efficiency, 19 REV. INDUS. ORG. 37, 37 (2001) (noting distinction goes to early
history of economics).
57 Competition Definition, EcONOMIST.COM, http://www.economist.com/economicsa-to-z/c (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
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affecting the market price."s8 Between monopoly and perfect
competition are degrees of imperfect competition.59
Others, like F.A. Hayek, question this theory of
competition. 60 Competition by its nature is not an end-state but a
complex and unpredictable dynamic process. The imperfections
and limitations of human knowledge and the variety of conditions
intrinsic to or affecting markets (including legal, social and ethical
norms, technology, production, and service norms) necessitate
against a stable competitive end-state.
The 2010 revisions to the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines
reflect the divide between static price competition and competition
as a dynamic process. 6 1 The 2010 Guidelines are an improvement
over the earlier Guidelines in recognizing non-price dimensions of
competition. 6 2 But the criticism remains that the 2010 Guidelines
primarily focus on static competition in narrowly defined antitrust
markets. 63 Thus, one complaint endures. Competition officials
recognize the importance of dynamic competition for our nation's

58 JOHN BLACK, A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 348 (1997); see also William J.
Kolasky, What Is Competition? A Comparison of U.S. and European Perspectives, 49
ANTITRUST BULL. 29, 31 (2004).
59 See F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 16-18 (2d ed. 1980).
6o FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER (1948); see also 2007
ICN REPORT, supra note 19, at 28 (noting that ten of thirty-two surveyed competition
agencies "focus[ed] on fostering a competitive process that is dynamic in nature").
61 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
(2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html.
62 Compare id. at § 2 (discussing throughout how market power can be manifested
in "non-price terms and conditions that adversely affect customers, including reduced
product quality, reduced product variety, reduced service, or diminished innovation"),
with U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
§ 0.1 n.6 (1992, revised 1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr
/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf (relegating non-price competition to one footnote: "Sellers
with market power also may lessen competition on dimensions other than price, such
as product quality, service, or innovation.").
63 See, e.g., Jay Ezrielev & Janusz A. Ordover, The 2010 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines:A Static Compass in a Dynamic World?, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct. 2010, at
1; J. Thomas Rosch, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm'n, The Next Challenges for
Antitrust Economists, Remarks at the NERA 2010 Antitrust & Trade Regulation
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/roschI
2010),
available at
(July
8,
Seminar
100708neraspeech.pdf.
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long-term economic growth, 6 4 but antitrust law has ossified
around static price competition.65
Consequently, competition, while ubiquitous, can take
different forms. Market participants compete to secure greater
monetary profits. Sycophants in authoritarian regimes compete to
curry favor with superiors. So, the issue is not whether
competition exists, but "what kind of competition should exist." 6 6
Competition can occur: (i) on various dimensions (such as price,
quality, service, variety, innovation) across markets; (ii) operating
at different levels of efficiency; (iii) with different levels of product
differentiation, entry barriers, and transparency; (iv) at different
stages of the product life cycle; and (v) with different demands for
technological innovation. But while competition is ubiquitous,
economists, policymakers and scholars have not agreed upon a
theory of competition.
II. RE-EXAMINING THE ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING
COMPETITION AND COMPETITION LAW
As Part I discusses, competition has multiple meanings. This
Part explores one reason why we have not arrived at one

64 Thomas 0. Barnett, Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice,
Competition Enforcement in an Innovative Economy 4-5, Remarks at the 4th Annual
Competition Policy Conference (June 20, 2008) (quoting Robert M. Solow, Prize in
Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1987: Growth Theory and After (Dec. 8,
1987), http://nobelprize.org/nobel prizes/economics/laureates/1987/solow-lecture.html),
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/234246.pdf.
65 J. Thomas Rosch, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Promoting Innovation:
Just How "Dynamic" Should Antitrust Law Be?, Remarks Before the USC Gould
School of Law 2010 Intellectual Property Institute (Mar. 23, 2010), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/100323uscremarks.pdf (observed how antitrust "has
historically focused more on static than dynamic analysis"); see also Michael E. Porter,
Competition and Antitrust: A Productivity-Based Approach, in UNIQUE VALUE:

COMPETITION BASED ON INNOVATION: CREATING UNIQUE VALUE FOR ANTITRUST, THE
ECONOMY, HEALTHCARE, EDUCATION AND BEYOND 154, 157 (Charles D. Weller ed.,

2004) ("While protecting short-run consumer welfare measured by price-cost margins is
... important, ... productivity growth through innovation, where innovation is defined
broadly to include not only products, but also processes and methods of management. .
. [are] the single most important determinant of long-term consumer welfare and a
nation's standard of living.").
66 LUDWIG VON MISES, BUREAUCRACY 86 (Bettina Bien Greaves ed., Liberty Fund
2007) (1944).
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satisfactory theory of competition. Any theory of competition
depends on its premises, the validity of which depends on the
context. Among the assumptions in any theory of competition are:
(i) the rationality of the market participants; (ii) the amount of
information they have; (iii) the transaction costs and the speed of
transactions; (iv) the degree to which market participants act
independently of one another and care about the interests of third
parties; and (v) how formal rules and informal social, ethical, or
moral norms affect the market participants' behavior.
This article focuses on one important assumption, namely the
extent to which firms, consumers, and the government are
rational and act with perfect willpower.6 7 In relaxing this
assumption, one's conception of competition changes. Firms can be
relatively more or less rational than consumers in displaying the
biases and heuristics identified in the behavioral economics
literature. Accordingly, our conception of competition can vary
under the following four scenarios:

Firms, Rational

Consumers,

Consumers,

Rational

Bounded Rational

I.

II.

Firms,
Bounded Rational
As economist Douglass North observed, "The government is
not a disinterested party in the economy." 68 Consequently, for
each scenario, this Part examines the policy implications if the
government is either relatively more or less rational than
consumers and firms.
Several caveats are necessary. First, this article simplifies by
examining consumers' and firms' rationality. One can extend the
analysis to the rationality of intermediaries (e.g., suppliers,
wholesalers, and retailers), and firms as buyers and consumers as
67 For the normative and descriptive shortcomings of the third prong of rational
choice theory, namely individuals pursue solely their economic self-interest, see Stucke,
supra note 48, at 907-17.
68 NORTH, supra note 41, at 67.
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sellers of services. Second, it is an oversimplification to say that
millions of consumers and firms are either rational or bounded
rational. Under any scenario, some market participants will be
relatively more rational and have greater willpower than others.
Bounded rationality and willpower can increase or decrease over
time. People at any moment can act "more or less rationally
depending on a host of situational, emotional, and other
contingent influences." 69 Nor is behavior consistent. People can
behave differently depending on their gender 70 or situational
factors, such as whether they are alone or in groups. 7 ' Third,
firms as institutions can be bounded rational, although in
different ways and degrees than consumers. Firms, at times, can
minimize individual biases, but at other times (such as cults,
mobs, and "groupthink" 72) can displace independent thinking.
Finally, in mapping each scenario, this article first examines
competition using the interaction of firms and consumers, and
then introduces the rationality of the government in discussing
the policy implications. This article's baseline is a free-market
economy. With a centrally-planned economy, the analysis begins
by examining the rationality of the government relative to private
firms and consumers. With these caveats in mind, the purpose
here is to explore generally how our theory of competition changes
when relaxing one key assumption.
III. FOUR SCENARIOS OF COMPETITION AND THEIR POLICY
IMPLICATIONS

A. Scenario I: Both Firms and Consumers Are Rational
The first scenario reflects neoclassical economic theory and
competition policy today. A perfectly competitive market assumes
69 Donald C. Langevoort, The Behavioral Economics of Mergers and Acquisitions,
12 TENN. J. Bus. L. 65 (2011), available at http://trace.tennessee.edultransactions/
voll2/iss2/4.
70 See, e.g., Jeff Sommer, How Men's Overconfidence Hurts Them as Investors, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 14, 2010, at BU4.
71 See PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT (2008).
72 Robert S. Baron, So Right It's Wrong: Groupthink and the Ubiquitous Nature of
Polarized Group Decision Making, in 37 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 219 (M.P. Zanna ed., 2005).
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transparent prices, highly elastic demand curves, easy entry and
exit, and perfectly informed, rational profit-maximizing producers
and consumers.73 In this scenario, price equals marginal cost.
Market forces will deliver the efficient level of outputs with the
most efficient techniques, using the minimum quantity of
inputs. 74
But perfect competition, critics have long argued, cannot
serve as the policymaker's conception of competition.7 5 First, as
the Chicago School jurist Richard Posner recognized, "No market
fits the economist's model of perfect competition."76 Second,
perfect competition is inconsistent with our real world view of
competition, which over the past century has increasingly focused
on productive and dynamic efficiencies.7 7 Imagine the reaction in
an Ivy-League MBA program, where perfect competition is the
idealized end-state. If true, perfect competition would render the
students' services and future employers' products as fungible and
their high tuition unnecessary. Instead, for MBA students,
competition "is a perpetual flight from the zero-profit abyss."78
73
74

See BLACK, supra note 58, at 348.
See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 106-41 (15th ed.

1995).

75 See Blaug, supra note 56, at 39; HAYEK, supra note 60, at 96; McNulty, supra
note 21, at 641; Park, supra note 21, at 349; see generally JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER,
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 1942).
76 FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d 901, 907 (7th Cir. 1989); accord United
States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1368 (5th Cir. 1980) ("Perfect
competition is a theoretical concept; all markets are subject to varying degrees of
imperfections . . . .") (quoting Arthur D. Austin, Real Estate Boards, and Multiple
Listing Systems as Restraints of Trade, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1353 (1970));
ANTITRUST

MODERNIZATION

COMM'N,

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

2

(2007),

available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edulamc/report-recommendation/amcfinal
report.pdf ("[T]he real world contains very few such markets.").
77 Vickers, supra note 20, at 7; see also Douglass C. North, Economic Performance
Through Time, 84 AM. EcON. REV. 359, 359 (1994) ("Neoclassical theory is simply an
inappropriate tool to analyze and prescribe policies that will induce development.");
HAYEK, supra note 60, at 96 ("Advertising, undercutting, and improving
("differentiating") the goods or services produced are all excluded by definition'perfect' competition means indeed the absence of all competitive activities."); McNulty,
supra note 21, at 649.
78 M.A. Adelman, Economic and Legal Concepts of Competition, 41 J. FARM EcON.
1197, 1197 (1959); see also Mary Keeney et al., How do Firms Set Prices? Survey
Evidence from Ireland 3 (May 2010) (Cent. Bank & Fin. Servs., Research Technical
available at
http://www.centralbank.ie/publications/
Paper
No.
7/RT/10),
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Third, the model, which idealizes homogeneity in products and
knowledge, is far from desirable. Who wants to live in a world
where after providing homogenous goods and services, we drive
homogenous cars to homogenous homes? 7 9
In defense of perfect competition, the Chicago School
economist George Stigler said that any concept to be useful in
scientific analysis must be abstract: "[I]f a science is to deal with a
large class of phenomena, clearly it cannot work with concepts
that are faithfully descriptive of even one phenomenon, for then
they will be grotesquely undescriptive of others."8 0 Under his
logic, zoologists could not distinguish among Alaskan Hares
(Lepus othus), Arctic Hares (Lepus arcticus), and Black-tailed
Jackrabbits (Lepus californicus). Zoologists simply would call
them collectively as creatures that hop. Moreover, if a zoologist
calls these creatures Alaskan Hares, she is correct at least
sometimes (when a Lepus othus hops by her). But if an economist
describes all competition as perfect competition, she is always
wrong. Perfect competition does not embrace or represent any
form of actual competition. It is akin to the Easter Bunny.
An economic model can assume idealized conditions: market
participants are rational with perfect knowledge of the conditions
of supply and demand. Under these conditions, market
participants "are supposed to know absolutely the consequence[s]
of their acts when they are performed, and to perform them in the
light of the consequences."8 1 But since perfect competition is

documents/7RT1O.pdf (finding that autonomous price setting prevails when a firm
considers competition to be absent, the most common approach in setting price is based
on firms' costs and self-determined profit margin, and only one-third of firms set price
primarily by following that of their closest competitor). For an excellent recent
discussion of this, see Deven R. Desai & Spencer Waller, Brands, Competition, and the
Law, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1425.
79 One example was the Cultural Revolution in China where "[a]ny form of
personal taste in clothing was out of bounds-women wore uniformly flat heels and
most people donned Red Guard-style green uniform jackets, baggy trousers and caps,
with a badge of the Chairman [Mao] on the tunic pocket." JONATHAN FENBY, THE
PENGUIN HISTORY OF MODERN CHINA: THE FALL AND RISE OF A GREAT POWER 18502009, at 457 (2009); see also RODERICK MACFARQUHAR & MICHAEL SCHOENHALS, MAO'S

LAST REVOLUTION 116 (2006).
80 Stigler, supra note 21, at 17.
81 Id. at 12 (quoting FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921)).
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neither descriptive nor normative, it is of little utility in dealing
with day-to-day antitrust issues.
The next gradation is to assume rational actors with
incomplete knowledge. Some information is unobtainable. Other
information, while obtainable, is too costly to procure. 82 In this
market economy, the Austrian School economist Ludwig von
Mises observed that rational consumers, not firms, should be
supreme. In their purchasing behavior, consumers ultimately
determine "what should be produced and in what quantity and
quality."8 3 Mises, in his belief of consumer sovereignty, was
skeptical about the evils of private monopolies-rational
consumers with willpower often can take care of themselves in the
marketplace. But this is not always true. 84 Imperfect information
and informational asymmetries, for example, can lead to "lemon"
markets where dishonest dealers for goods or services drive out
honest dealers, 85 and thereby inhibit innovation.
The trickier aspect, as the next three scenarios address, is
the descent to bounded rational actors with imperfect willpower,
who act with incomplete knowledge.
82 William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the
Integration of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST
L.J. 207, 250 (2003) ("Rational consumers and producers will invest in becoming
informed only up until the point where the marginal cost of information equals its
marginal value.").
83 MISES, supra note 66, at 17.
84 See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 47778 (1992); Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 446 n.4 (3d Cir.
1997) (Lay, J., dissenting) ("Kodak is merely a concession to fact that markets do not
always work perfectly, and sometimes, but not always, these [information]
imperfections can create sufficient market power to justify possible antitrust
liability."); see also Robert H. Lande, Chicago Takes It On The Chin: Imperfect
Information Could Play A Crucial Role In The Post-Kodak World, 62 ANTITRUST L.J.
193, 195 (1993) ("Another important lesson of Kodak is that imperfect information can
be a crucial factor in defining relevant markets.").
85 See FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483, 494 (1922) ("The honest
manufacturer's business may suffer, not merely through a competitor's deceiving his
direct customer, the retailer, but also through the competitor's putting into the hands
of the retailer an unlawful instrument, which enables the retailer to increase his own
sales of the dishonest goods, thereby lessening the market for the honest product.");
George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons"- Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 495 (1970) (explaining that the cost of dishonesty
includes "loss incurred from driving legitimate business out of existence").
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1. Scenario I's Policy Implications Assuming the Government Is
Rational
A trinity of rational firms, consumers, and government
paradoxically can justify either limited government or a centrallyplanned economy.8 6 As Stigler observed, a "perfect market may
also exist under monopoly."87 Logically monopolies can be private
or government enterprises. If the latter, a state planner could
model scenarios using the hypothetical profit-maximizer and
centrally plan a similar outcome. Because rational profitmaximizing behavior is predictable, a temptation exists to nudge
competition closer to perfect competition under "the guiding hand
of some elite corps of governmental and non-governmental policymakers."88
On the other hand, the stronger the presumption of
rationality, the laissez-faire argument goes, the more likely the
market is perceived in becoming efficient, and the less need for
market
rational
Generally,
regulation.8 9
governmental
participants acting with the optimal amount of information in
markets with no negative externalities, do not need much
governmental protection.9 0 Transactions are presumably mutually
beneficial: market participants contract to further their interests.
The government perhaps can facilitate competition by reducing
the market participants' transaction costs (such as providing a
model contract and well-functioning judiciary system) or by
lowering the participants' search and information costs (such as

86 See JOHN CASSIDY, How MARKETS FAIL: THE LOGIC OF ECONOMIC CALAMITIES 59
(2009) (discussing Oskar Lange's same observations on a centrally-planned economy
and perfect competition).
87 Stigler, supra note 21, at 14.
88 Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
377, 378 (1965).
89 See Town Sound & Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 468,
485 n.23 (3d Cir. 1992) ("Most of the work of 'Chicago School' theorists has centered on
the general proposition that significant economic harm cannot occur (and hence the
antitrust laws should not interfere) in competitive markets."); Michael A. Salinger,
BehavioralEconomics, Consumer Protection, and Antitrust, 6 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L
65, 68 (2010).
90 See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 7, at 69.
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combating fraud).9 ' But the stronger the rationality presumption,
the more likely the government, subject to rent-seeking, is
perceived to impede efficiency. 92
Even in Scenario I, it does not follow that the government
does little. First, the government must address the commonly
identified types of market failure under neoclassical economic
theory, such as: (i) the sustained exercise of market power;9 3 (ii)
externalities; 94 (iii) public goods; 95 and (iv) significant
informational asymmetries or uncertainty.9 6 So, the rational
government can increase price transparency (by restricting
competitors' concerted efforts to reduce it or mandating public
disclosures), internalize negative externalities (such as imposing
on polluters a carbon tax), prosecute anticompetitive restraints of
trade (such as price-fixing cartels or monopolist's efforts to
unfairly increase rivals' costs or deter entry), and enjoin mergers
to monopoly.
Second, competitive markets do not always yield the best or
desired outcome. "It is not a correct deduction from the Principles
of Economics that enlightened self-interest always operates in the
public interest."9 7 Unbridled capitalism, Professors Akerlof and
Shiller write, "does not automatically produce what people really
need; it produces what they think they need, and are willing to

ex See generally Maurice E. Stucke, How Do (and Should) Competition Authorities
Treat a Dominant Firm's Deception?, 63 SMU L. REV. 1069 (2010).
92 See, e.g., Avinash Dixit, In Honor of Paul Krugman: Winner of the John Bates
Clark Medal, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 173, 182 n.7 (1993) ("[T]here is no market failure so
bad that the U.S. government and political process could not do even worse.").
93 CASSIDY, supra note 86, at 126.
94 A.C. PIGOU, THE EcONOMICS OF WELFARE 192 (4th ed. 1962); BLACK, supra note
58, at 168 (where the "cost or benefit arising from any activity which does not accrue to
the person or organization carrying on the activity").
95 Francis M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q.J. ECON. 351, 369 (1958)
(whereby the payers for the goods cannot exclude the non-payers from consuming (or
benefitting) from the goods (e.g., national defense)).
96 Asymmetric Information Definition, ECONOMIST.COM, http://www.economist.com/
economics-a-to-z#node-2 1529485 (defining asymmetric information as "[w]hen
somebody knows more than somebody else"); see also Frangois Moreau, The Role of the
State in Evolutionary Economics, 28 CAMBRIDGE J. EcON. 847, 849 (2004).
91 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE END OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE 39 (1927); see also STIGLITZ,
supra note 2, at 273.
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pay for."98 Competition can maximize output of products that
eventually wipe out the economy.9 9
Third, the government must address behavior that is
individually rational but collectively irrational. 0 0 In examining
the financial crisis, for example, Posner described how rational
self-interested behavior of "law-abiding financiers and consumers
can precipitate an economic disaster."' 0 Self-interest, for Posner,
is a private virtue in that competition drives businesses to profitmaximization, which drives economic progress.102 But competitive
self-interested behavior, at times, is a public vice. An
overleveraged financial institution can ignore the small
probability that its risky conduct in conjunction with its
competitors' risky conduct may bring down the entire economy.
Each firm in pursuing its self-interest will incur greater leverage
to maximize profits.' 0 3 So, even for rational-choice theorists like
Posner, the government must serve as a countervailing force to
such self-interested rational private behavior by better regulating
financial institutions. 104
2. Scenario I's Policy Implications Assuming the Government Is
Bounded Rational
Rational firms and consumers often will be worse off when a
bounded rational government seeks to regulate their competitive
behavior. Market forces invariably would provide a more efficient
or timely solution.iO5

8 AKERLOF & SHILLER, supranote 5, at 26.
99 Id.; see also Anthony Faiola et al., What Went Wrong?, WASH. POST, Oct. 15,
2008, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article
/2008/10/14/AR2008101403343.html (noting several Clinton and Bush Administration
officials' opposition to regulation of derivatives).
100 CASSIDY, supra note 86, at 139-50, 309.
101 RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE
DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 107 (2009); see also id. at 111-12; CASSIDY, supra note 86,
at 209-17.
102 POSNER, supra note 101, at 107.
103 See, e.g., CASSIDY, supra note 86, at 221-27.
104 POSNER, supra note 101, at 106-07.
1o5 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION
124 (2005) ("[Markets generally work well when left alone, [and] intervention is
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But one first must inquire why the government is less
rational than the market participants. One theory is
dispositional-the
government
attracts bounded
rational
employees, namely, as Mises called them, those "unfit to serve
[their] fellow citizens," but who want to rule them. 0 6 But this
assumes that civil servants' disposition differs from consumers'
and firms'. Government workers, however, are also consumers
(and former employees in private firms). Consequently, it is
unlikely that civil servants are more rational in their private
market transactions (or prior jobs) than in their government
offices.
A second theory is that the bounded rationality is situational.
Market forces provide greater incentives for private firms and
consumers to improve their willpower and rationality. 0 7 In their
work decisions, civil servants, in contrast, have weaker incentives
to avoid mistakes because of political myopia, the lack of direct
accountability to voters, and regulatory capture. Under this
theory, attracting business executives to oversee government
agencies, and promoting a revolving door between the government
and private sector will not eliminate bounded rationality, as the
situational forces remain. The bureaucracy is not structured to
experiment for the purpose of maximizing profits, but for the
employees, consistent with the rule of law, to "obey rules and
regulations established by a superior body." 0 8
Logically under this scenario, a bounded rational government
should not be problematic for competition policy. There exists the
risk that the government, captured by powerful interests, impedes
competition. But rational citizens, recognizing this risk, would
rely on structural, rather than behavioral, safeguards to prevent
the concentration of power in either the government or

justified only in the relatively few cases where the judiciary can fix the problem more
reliably, more cheaply, or more quickly than the market can fix itself.").
106 MISES, supra note 66, at 75.
107 See Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism & Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 14041, 144-45 (2006) (modeling how consumers face stronger incentives to correct errors
that directly impact their well-being than do government bureaucrats).
108 MISES, supra note 66, at 55.
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marketplace. 0 9 Accordingly, the demand for governmental
antitrust services would diminish to the instances of sustained
market failure, which market forces cannot correct. The bounded
rational government would undertake measures (preferably
structural) to prevent (or remedy) these market failures, under
the careful guidance of rational voters. Otherwise, rational market
participants in a well-functioning democracy would increasingly
rely on market forces for the solution.

B. Scenario II: RationalFirms and Bounded Rational
Consumers
If firms are relatively more rational than consumers, then
firms can compete to exploit or help consumers with bounded
rationality and willpower. Consumers with bounded willpower
sacrifice their long-term interests (such as increased savings) for
immediate consumption (and increased debt),"') and display timeinconsistent preferences. 1 ' When the activity involves immediate
costs and delayed benefits (e.g., exercising, studying), consumers
procrastinate.11 2 When the activity involves immediate benefits

109 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIv., ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE
TO MERGER REMEDIES 7 (Oct. 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
guidelines/205108.pdf (stating that structural remedies in merger cases are preferred
as "they are relatively clean and certain, and generally avoid costly government
entanglement in the market"); Louis D. Brandeis, Address before the New England Dry
Goods Association at Boston (Feb. 11, 1908), in THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC VIEWS OF
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 386, 386 (Alfred Lief ed., 1930) (observing how accepting
mergers to monopolies with behavioral safeguards is like "surrendering liberty and
substituting despotism with safeguards").
110 See Ned Welch, A Marketer's Guide to Behavioral Economics, MCKINSEY Q., Feb.
2010,
available
at
http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/A-marketers-guide-to
behavioral economics 2536.
nI See Samuel M. McClure et al., Separate Neural Systems Value Immediate &
Delayed Monetary Rewards, SC., Oct. 15, 2004, at 504 (noting how if someone offered
$10 today versus $11 tomorrow, a person would be tempted to choose the former;
whereas if present choice involved a distant payoff ($10 in a year from now versus $11
in a year and a day from now), same person would likely choose the latter).
112 See generally Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing it Now or Later, 89 AM.
ECON. REV. 103 (1999) (discussing welfare implications of a sophisticated person, who
knows exactly what her future self s preferences will be, and naive person, who believes
her future self s preferences will be identical to her current selfs, not realizing that as
she gets closer to executing decisions her tastes will change).
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and delayed costs, consumers find it harder to delay
gratification.113
Behavioral economics, commented one of its pioneers, uses
scientific methods to explore human behavior already known to
"advertisers and used-car salesmen." 114 Rational firms manipulate
consumption decisions by:
(i) using framing effects and changing the reference point,
such that the price change is viewed as a discount, rather
than a surcharge;" 5
(ii) anchoring consumers to an artificially high suggested
retail price, from which bounded rational consumers
negotiate;116
(iii) adding decoy options (such as a restaurant's adding a
higher priced wine) to steer consumers to higher margin
goods and services;1 17

113 Id.
at 109-10 (using example of seeing a mediocre film this weekend rather than
waiting to see a better film released several weeks later).
114 GARY BELSKY & THOMAS GILOVICH, WHY SMART PEOPLE MAKE BIG MONEY
MISTAKES-AND How TO CORRECT THEM: LESSONS FROM THE NEW SCIENCE OF
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 23 (1999) (quoting Amos Tversky).
u15 The way the choice is framed-such as a sure gain or avoiding a loss-can
significantly impact the outcome of the consumers' choice. Daniel Kahneman, Maps of
Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449,
1458 (2003). Consumers may be less concerned with the elimination of a discount than
a price increase (although both have the same net effect). Thus, deviations from the
perceived reference point may be marked by asymmetric price elasticity: consumers
may be more sensitive to (and angry about) price increases than when the
manufacturer eliminates a discount or does not reduce prices during periods of
deflation.
116 In one experiment, MBA students put down the last two digits of their social
security number (e.g., 14). The students, then participants, monetized it (e.g., $14), and
then answered for each bidded item "Yes or No" if they would pay that amount for the
item. The students then stated the maximum amount they were willing to pay for each
auctioned product. Students with the highest ending SSN (80-99) bid the highest and
those with the lowest SSN (1-20) bid the lowest, and those with highest-ending SSN
bid 216 to 346 percent higher than students with low-end SSNs. DAN ARIELY,

PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 25-28
(2008).

n1 Similarly, people "rarely choose things in absolute terms," but instead based on
their relative advantage to other things. Id. at 2. As Ariely discusses, by adding a third
more expensive choice, for example, the marketer can steer consumers to a more
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(iv) using the sunk cost fallacy to remind bounded rational
consumers of the financial commitment they already made to
induce them to continue paying installments on an item,
whose value is less than the remainder of payments;1 18
(v) using the availability heuristic"l 9 to drive purchases, such
as an airline travel insurer using an emotionally salient death
(from "terrorist acts") rather than a death from "all possible
causes"; 120
of the focusing illusion in
(vi) taking advantage
advertisements (i.e., consumers predicting greater personal
happiness from consumption of the advertised good and not
accounting one's adaptation to the new product);1 2 1
(vii) giving the impression that their goods and services are of
better quality because they are higher priced;1 22 and

expensive second choice. Id. MIT students, in one experiment, were offered three
choices for the Economist magazine: (i) Internet-only subscription for $59 (sixteen
students); (ii) print-only subscriptions for $125 (no students); and (iii) print-andInternet subscriptions for $125 (eighty-four students). Id. at 5. When the "decoy"
second choice (print-only subscriptions) was removed and only the first and third
options were presented, the students did not react similarly. Id. at 5-6. Instead sixtyeight students opted for Internet-only subscriptions for $59 (up from sixteen students)
and only thirty-two students chose print-and-Internet subscriptions for $125 (down
from eighty-four students). Id. at 5-6.
118 Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of
PredatoryLending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 792 (2006).
119 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, Scl., Sept. 27, 1974, at 1127 (noting situations where people assess the
"frequency of a class or the probability of an event by the ease with which instances or
occurrences can be brought to mind").
120 See generally Eric J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and
InsuranceDecisions, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 35 (1993).
121 See BELSKY & GILOVICH, supra note 114, at 225.
Ariely, for example, conducted several experiments that revealed the power of
12
higher prices. ARIELY, supra note 116, at 181-86. In one experiment, nearly all the
participants reported less pain after taking a placebo priced at $2.50 per dose; when
the placebo was discounted to $0.10 per dose, only half of the participants experienced
less pain. Id. at 182-83. Similarly, MIT students who paid regular price for the "SoBe
Adrenaline Rush" beverage reported less fatigue than the students who paid one-third
of regular price for the same drink. Id. at 184-85. SoBe Adrenaline Rush beverage was
next promoted as energy for the students' mind, and students after drinking the
placebo, had to solve as many word puzzles as possible within thirty minutes. Students
who paid regular price for the drink got on average nine correct responses, versus
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(viii) seeking to avoid price competition through branding.123
Credit card issuers, as one example, can capitalize on this
bounded rationality and willpower in two ways. First, they can
compete in ways to encourage consumers to charge more and incur
greater debt (and maximize fees for the banks).124 Second, credit
card issuers can compete in helping consumers achieve their longterm interests by providing them with commitment devices. Every
day, for example, people have part of their salaries automatically
deducted into separate investment accounts, hire personal
trainers to ensure they exercise, or set their clocks slightly fast.
Banks accordingly can help consumers increase personal savings
by offering them credit cards designed toward that end.
Consumers in their dispassionate state, for example, can elect to
students who paid a discounted price for the same drink got on average 6.5 questions
right. Id. at 185-86. Similarly, according to researchers at the Stanford Graduate
School of Business and the California Institute of Technology:
[I]f a person is told he or she is tasting two different wines-and that one
costs $5 and the other $45 when they are, in fact, the same wine-the part of
the brain that experiences pleasure will become more active when the drinker
thinks he or she is enjoying the more expensive vintage.
News Release, Stanford Univ. News Serv., Price Tag Can Change the Way People
Experience Win, Study Shows (Jan. 15, 2008), available at http://newsservice.stanford.edu/pr/2008/pr-wine-011608.html; see also Jonathan D. Glater & Alan
Finder, In Tuition Game, Popularity Rises With Price, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 12, 2006, at Al
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/12/education/12tuition.html?pagewanted
=print (discussing how Ursinus College, believing it was losing applicants because of
its low tuition, raised its tuition and fees 17.6% in 2000 (but offered more financial aid)
and received nearly 200 more applications the following year).
123 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A
Reference-Dependent Model, 106 Q.J. EcON. 1039, 1054-58 (1991). A famous antitrust
example is Clorox, whose bleach is chemically indistinguishable from rival brands. FTC
v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967). Nonetheless, Clorox invested millions of
dollars in promoting its brand of bleach, and often charged a higher price for its bleach.
One would think that a market, where one company sells a fungible chemically
indistinguishable product at a price premium, would be attractive for potential
entrants. But Procter & Gamble sought to purchase Clorox rather than enter the liquid
bleach market independently. And Clorox bleach, according to the company website,
remains today the U.S. industry leader with eight out of ten American households
using the brand. About Clorox, CLOROX, http://www.clorox.com/about-us/ (last visited
Nov. 1, 2011).
124 Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 56
(2008) ("[D]ata on credit choice and use show that consumer mistakes cost hundreds of
dollars a year per consumer.").
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cap subsequent credit card purchases for certain categories of
goods or services (e.g., limiting spending on Starbucks coffee to $5
per week). 1 25
At times, exploiting irrationality benefits society. Rational
firms can dampen investors' speculation (e.g., buying a company's
stock on the hope that past price increases will continue with
future price increases). Predictions markets can be construed as a
form of behavioral exploitation. These predictions markets
typically have a defined event (e.g., the winner of the U.S.
presidential elections) and an end date when all bets are settled.
Each market participant possesses partial knowledge. Moreover,
some participants may be overly optimistic about the predicted
outcome. Rational investors can exploit this irrationality, and the
prediction market as a result can yield remarkably accurate
predictions.126

Under Scenario II, firms may not always exploit consumers.
Firms may be unable to identify those consumers whose biases,
heuristics, and willpower make them more vulnerable. Identifying
instances where bounded rationality can be exploited can be a
business unto itself.127 Rational firms can target bounded rational
consumers by offering to help them with their earlier problems,
such as selling their time shares, preventing home foreclosures, or
improving their credit rating.
But rational firms, even after identifying bounded rational
consumers, cannot always exploit them. Consumers, recognizing
their bounded rationality, can turn to rational advisors or
consumer advocates (such as Consumers Reports). Many markets,
unlike prediction markets, lack a defined end-point. A rational
investor could "short" a company's stock to profit when the stock
125 See Ron Lieber, Your Card Has Been Declined, Just as You Wanted, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 13, 2010, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/14/yourmoney/credit-and-debit-cards/14money.html?src=me&ref-business.
126 See Colin F. Camerer & Ernst Fehr, When Does "Economic Man" Dominate
Social Behavior?, Sci., Jan. 6, 2006, at 47, 52; see also HAYEK, supra note 60, at 91.
127 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 124, at 23-24. Credit rating agency Equifax, for
example, advertises "'advanced profiling techniques' to identify people who show a
'statistical propensity to acquire new credit' within [ninety] days." Brad Stone, Banks
Mine Data and Woo Troubled Borrowers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2008, at B1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/22/business/22target.html?_r=1.
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price declines. 128 But rational traders often do not know when the
speculative bubble will burst. Rational traders, due to investor
pressure, can be subject to short-term horizons, and follow the
herd for short-term gains.12 9 Rational traders may also make more
money by creating products that encourage, rather than deter,
speculation. 130
Alternatively, consumers, recognizing their bounded
rationality, can turn to rational advisors or consumer advocates
(such as Consumers Reports). Moreover the window for
exploitation can be short-lived. Consumers can make better
decisions as they gain experience, receive feedback quickly on
their earlier errors, and discover some of the biases and heuristics
in their earlier decisions.s1 3
Scenario II competition presents other forms of market
failure. One is systemic behavioral exploitation.132 In competitive
markets, one expects rational firms to inform bounded rational
consumers of other firms' attempts to exploit them. Providing this
information is another facet of competition-trust us, we will not

128 See
The Motley Fool, The Fool FAQ: Shorting Stocks, FOOL.COM,
http://www.fool.com/FoolFAQ/FoolFAQ0033.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2011) ("An
investor who sells stock short borrows shares from a brokerage house and sells them to
another buyer. Proceeds from the sale go into the shorter's account. He must buy those
shares back (cover) at some point in time and return them to the lender.").
129 Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35
(2007); see also James Mackintosh, Decoding the Psychology of Trading, FIN. TIMES,
July 16, 2010, at 15 (discussing how hedge funds seek to exploit investors' bounded
rationality by monitoring investor sentiments in the press), available at
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7332e44a-9109- lldf-b297-00144feab49a.html#axzzlcqv
XVO8i; CASSIDY, supranote 86, at 177-81.
13o ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL
FINANCE 172 (2002) (citing several examples, including future contracts on tulips
during the Tulipmania of the 1630s); CASSIDY, supra note 86, at 182-84.
13a John A. List, Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?, 118 Q.J.
ECON. 41, 41 (2003).
132 Max Huffman, Bridging the Divide? Theories for Integrating Competition Law
and Consumer Protection, 6 EuR. COMPETITION J. 7, 17-18 (2010) (discussing how
behavioral exploitation may produce longer-lasting consumer harm). Prof. Huffman's
article prompted an interesting roundtable discussion among competition law lawyers,
economists, and policy officials. Antitrust Marathon IV With Authority-A Discussion
Led by Philip Marsden and Spencer Weber Waller, 6 EUR. COMPETITION J. 1, 1-127
(2010).
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exploit you. 13 3 But too frequently, rather than compete to build
consumers' trust in their business, competitors engage in similar
exploitation.13 4
Rational firms can compete in finding cleverer ways to
attract and exploit bounded rational consumers. The U.K.'s Office
of Fair Trading recently experimented with five common price
frames: (i) "drip pricing," where a lower price is initially disclosed
to the consumer and additional charges are added as the sale
progresses; (ii) "sales," where the "sales" price is referenced off an
inflated regular price (e.g., was $2, now $1); (iii) "complex pricing"
(e.g., three-for-two offers), where the unit price requires some
computation; (iv) "baiting," where sellers promote special deals
with only a limited number of goods available at the discounted
price; and (v) "time limited offers," where the special price is

133 See SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 965 (10th Cir. 1994) ("If the
structure of the market is such that there is little potential for consumers to be
harmed, we need not be especially concerned with how firms behave because the
presence of effective competition will provide a powerful antidote to any effort to exploit
consumers." (quoting George A. Hay, Market Power in Antitrust, 60 ANTITRUST L.J.
807, 808 (1992))).
134 See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 474
n.21 (1992) (noting that "in an equipment market with relatively few sellers,
competitors may find it more profitable to adopt Kodak's service and parts policy than
to inform the consumers"); FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 308, 313
(1934) (finding that while competitors "reluctantly yielded" to the challenged practice
to avoid loss of trade to their competitors, a "trader may not, by pursuing a dishonest
practice, force his competitors to choose between its adoption or the loss of their
trade"); Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 120 F.2d 175, 179 (6th Cir. 1941) (Ford following
industry leader General Motors in advertising a deceptive six-percent financing plan);
Matthew Bennett et al., What Does Behavioral Economics Mean for Competition
Policy?, 6 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 111, 118 (2010); Eliana Garcds, The Impact of
Behavioral Economics on Consumer and Competition Policies, 6 COMPETITION POL'Y
INT'L 145, 150 (2010); Huffman, supra note 132. Antitrust scholar Robert Steiner, who
was also the former president of the Kenner Products toy company, described his
concerns about the industry self-regulation of toy commercials in the 1960s and 1970s.
Originally favoring industry self-policing, he feared the greater anticompetitive
consequences of deceptive advertising. Absent regulation, some toy manufacturers
would air deceptive ads, which would pull down the toy industry. Unless his company
matched "the exaggerations and sometimes the outright deceptions of certain
competitors, our commercials might not be exciting enough to move our toys off the
shelves." He foresaw bad commercials driving out the good ones, rendering television
advertising relatively ineffective. Robert L. Steiner, Double Standards in the
Regulation of Toy Advertising, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1259, 1264 (1988).
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available for a short period. 35 The OFT experiment found how
firms can manipulate consumer consumption behavior and leave
them worse off, especially under drip pricing and time-limited
offers. Not surprisingly one sees exploitive "drip pricing" for
airline tickets, 3 6 car rentals,1 3 7 and prepaid telephone calling
cards. 138
To exploit consumers, rational firms can compete in ways to
reduce price transparency and increase the complexity of their
products (or product terms). 3 9 Credit cards are one example. A
single credit card account can have multiple APRs for different
'35 OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, THE IMPACT OF PRICE FRAMES ON CONSUMER DECISION
MAKING 6 (May 2010), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared-oft/economic
researchlOFT1226.pdf.
136 The airlines are clever in their surcharges for pieces and weight of luggage,
phone reservation fees, meals, beverages, headsets, extra legroom, etc. These extra fees
often are not quoted in the initial price displayed to customers but later when
consumers are completing their purchase. See e.g., Alex Altman & Kate Pickert, New
Airline Surcharge: A Bag Too Far?, TIME, May 22, 2008, available at
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1808804,00.html; Jad Mouawad &
Claire Cain Miller, Search for Low Airfares Gets More Competitive, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
10, 2011, at Bl, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/11/business/11air.html.
137 In re Dollar Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 116 F.T.C. 255 (1993) (requiring Dollar to
disclose to consumers in its ads the existence of any mandatory fuel charges, airport
surcharges or other charges not reasonably avoidable by consumers); In re Value RentA-Car, Inc., 116 F.T.C. 245 (1993) (same); In re Gen. Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 111 F.T.C.
694 (1989) (requiring national car rental company to disclose charges that are
mandatory or are not reasonably avoidable to every consumer that inquires about
prices); In re Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 111 F.T.C. 644 (1989) (settling charges that its
operators failed to disclose to consumers the existence and amount of airport
surcharges and mandatory fuel charges when consumers inquire about possible rental
of Alamo's vehicles).
13s Bennett et al., supra note 134, at 117.
139 See, e.g., Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer
Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. ECON. 505,
505-08 (2006); Edward J. Janger & Susan Block-Lieb, Consumer Credit and
Competition: The Puzzle of Competitive Credit Markets, 6 EUR. COMPETITION J. 68, 71
(2010) ("Price competition often takes the form of price concealment."); Bar-Gill &
Warren, supra note 124, at 27-28; JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 7, at 81, 108. Visa,
MasterCard, and American Express, the DOJ recently alleged, sought to reduce price
transparency for their credit card network services. Complaint for Equitable Relief for
Violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 at 2-3, United States v. Am.
Express Co., No. CV 10-4496, 2010 WL 3836766 (E.D.N.Y Oct. 4, 2010) (alleging that
merchants were prohibited from informing consumers of the merchants' cost in using a
particular credit card network, or to encourage the customer to use a less costly credit
card or payment method). Visa and MasterCard subsequently settled with the DOJ.

MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL

138

[VOL. 81:2

types of credit extensions or that apply for limited time periods.
General purpose credit card issuers can compete by reducing
"front-end" costs, such as eliminating annual fees and
substantially discounting initial interest rates. Consumers, illinformed about the long-term costs of different credit cards, can
make decisions on incidental benefits (such as receiving a T-shirt
with the university logo when signing up for a credit card on a
college campus). The credit card companies then overcharge the
consumer on the less salient "back-end" costs, with higher late
fees and penalties and over-the-credit-limit fees. 14 0 At times,
consumers are disclosed the information but do not understand
the key terms that affect the cost of using their credit card; at
other times, consumers simply do not act on the information.14 1
Rational companies can exploit consumers' optimism bias.
One former CEO, for example, explained how his credit card
company targeted low-income customers "by offering 'free' credit
cards that carried heavy hidden fees." 14 2 The former CEO
explained how these ads targeted consumers' optimism: "When
people make the buying decision, they don't look at the penalty
fees because they never believe they'll be late. They never believe
they'll be over limit, right?" 43 Consumers are overoptimistic on
their ability and willpower to pay off the credit card purchases
timely. They underestimate the costs of their future
borrowings.1 44 So, the optimistic consumers choose credit cards
with lower annual fees (but higher financing fees and penalties)

140 See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed Reserve Sys., Statement by
Chairman Ben S. Bernanke (May 2, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/press/bereg/bernankecredit2008O502.htm.
141 See JAMES M. LACKO & JANIS K. PAPPALARDO, Improving Consumer Mortgage
Disclosures: An Empirical Assessment of Current and Prototype Disclosure Forms,
FTC.GOV (June 2007),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/06/PO25505MortgageDisclosure
Report.pdf.
142 FRONTLINE:
The
Card Game,
(Nov.
24,
2009),
available at
(interview with former
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/creditcards/view/
Providian CEO Shailesh Mehta).
143

Id.

See Sha Yang et al., Unrealistic Optimism in Consumer Credit Card Adoption,
28 J. EcoN. PSYCHOL. 170 (2007); JOHNSON & KWAK, supranote 7, at 196-97.
144
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over better suited products (e.g., credit cards with higher annual
fees but lower interest rates and late payment penalties).14 5
For other competitors, it may make sense to exploit consumer
biases rather than incur the costs to debias. Suppose a credit card
issuer incurs the cost to educate consumers of their bounded
willpower and overconfidence. Other competitors can free-ride on
the company's educational efforts and quickly offer similar credit
cards with lower annual fees. Ultimately, such competition would
reduce the credit card industry's profits, without offering any
lasting competitive advantage to the first-mover.146 Consequently,
the industry is better off exploiting consumers' bounded
rationality. Consumers, overconfident in their financial prowess,
will not demand better-suited products. Firms have little financial
incentive to help consumers make better choices.1 47 Market
demand, accordingly, will skew toward products and services that
exploit or reinforce the consumers' bounded willpower and
rationality.
1. Scenario II's Policy Risks Assuming the Government Is
Rational
Customers under this scenario may reign supreme (in
choosing commitment devices to address their bounded rationality
and willpower) or be exploited. So, in distinguishing between
behavioral exploitation and when firms are helping bounded
rational consumers, the government under Scenario II faces two
difficulties.
One difficulty is that the government cannot necessarily rely
on consumers' choices to infer their utility. Economists historically
assessed people's preferences, not by their subjective beliefs or
intentions, but by their actual choices.1 48 But if heuristics and
Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 124, at 46.
Id. at 8-9, 20-21.
141 See, e.g., HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 61, at § 7.2 (noting how
the market is more vulnerable to coordinated conduct if a firm that first offers a lower
price or improved product to customers will retain relatively few customers after its
rivals respond).
148 See Revealed PreferenceDefinition, ECONOMIST.coM, http://www.economist.com/
economics-a-to-z/r#node-21529779 (last visited Nov. 1, 2011) ("To model demand it is
only necessary to be able to compare an individual's consumption decisions in
145
146
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biases systematically appear in consumer decision-making, then
consumer choices do not necessarily reflect their actual
preferences.1 49 Bounded rational consumers can predict poorly as
to what makes them happy. 5 0 At times, firms manipulate
consumer choices through advertising and promotions.15
A second difficulty is that some sophisticated consumers,
aware of their bounded rationality and willpower, will incur costs
on commitment devices that could appear to a rational
government as exploitative. Take for example Christmas club
savings accounts. Bank customers deposit throughout the year
into their Christmas accounts (which do not offer superior interest
rates) and cannot withdraw the funds until the holidays. A
rational government official could view Christmas accounts as
exploitative. Customers get less (in terms of interest rate and
liquidity). Banks get more (longer time horizon to use funds
without risk of withdrawals). Rational consumers with willpower
would chose risk-free illiquid funds with better yields (e.g.,
Certificates of Deposit) or keep the funds in their savings
accounts. But Christmas accounts provide bounded rational
consumers with a commitment device and divisibility (namely a
separate account earmarked for Christmas shopping).1 52
situations with different prices and/or incomes and to assume that consumers are
consistent in their decisions over time (that is, if they prefer wine to beer in one period
they will still prefer wine in the next).").
149 See Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, What Can Economists Learn from Happiness
Research?, 40 J. ECON. LITERATURE 402, 404-05 (2002); Daniel Kahneman & Alan B.
Krueger, Developments in the Measurement of Subjective Well-Being, 20 J. ECON.
PERSP. 3, 3-4 (2006) ("If people display bounded rationality when it comes to
maximizing utility, then their choices do not necessarily reflect their 'true' preferences,
and an exclusive reliance on choices to infer what people desire loses some of its
appeal."); George Loewenstein & Peter A. Ubel, Hedonic Adaptation and the Role of
Decision and Experience Utility in Public Policy, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1795 (2008); Garc6s,
supra note 134, at 148.
150 See Daniel Kahneman & Richard H. Thaler, Utility Maximization & Experienced
Utility, 20 J. EcON. PERSP. 221 (2006); Daniel Kahneman et al., Would You Be Happier
If You Were Richer? A Focusing Illusion, SCl., June 30, 2006, at 1908; David A.
Schkade & Daniel Kahneman, Does Living in California Make People Happy?, 9
PSYCHOL. SCI. 345 (1998).
151 See DEREK BOK, THE POLITICS OF HAPPINESS 76, 115-17, 206 (2010); JOHN
KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY (2d ed. 1998).
152 Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS 75 (Colin F. Camerer et al. eds., 2004).
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Thus, a key issue under Scenario II is how the rational
government identifies and responds to sustained behavioral
exploitation. Authoritarianism and corporate autocracy are two
worst-case scenarios.
Under a market economy, consumers, through their informed
economic decisions, should ultimately reign supreme. But if
bounded rational consumers choose poorly, one danger is that the
rational government by default decides for consumers. If
consumers are bounded rational, the justification goes, markets
are not functioning as efficiently as they could be; thus the state
becomes the de facto guardian to protect its citizens from their
irrationality. But a heightened concern about consumers' bounded
rationality raises far greater social and political concerns over
consumer sovereignty and "the intrusion of bureaucracy into all
spheres of human life and activity." 53 The concern over
behavioral exploitation can increasingly justify "the subordination
of every individual's whole life, work, and leisure to the orders of
those in power and office."1 54
In displacing individual autonomy, the rational government
does not help consumers improve their willpower or rationality.
Instead the government promotes learned helplessness. The
government devotes greater energies to regulate marketplace
behavior and displace the market's function in finding solutions
for consumers' problems. 5 5 The government devises ways to
improve consumers' diets and limit the consumption of unhealthy
products. Next, the government encourages citizens to use their
leisure time more productively, such as exercising and reading,
rather than watching television. 156

MISES, supranote 66, at 14.
Id. at 17.
155 See J. Thomas Rosch, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Intel, Apple, Google,
Microsoft, and Facebook: Observations on Antitrust and the High-Tech Sector, Address
at the ABA Antitrust Section Fall Forum (Nov. 18, 2010), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/101118fallforum.pdf (recognizing "strong argument
that having the state call the shots respecting consumer choice not only defeats the
outcome that market forces would dictate, but also smacks of the kind of 'central
planning' characteristic of a totalitarian state").
156 See MISES, supra note 66, at 22.
153

154
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The concern is creeping authoritarianism. To protect its
citizens, the government places greater restrictions on the
citizens' ability to manage their affairs. A bureaucracy that exists
to protect its bounded rational citizens does not have much
incentive to improve the citizens' bounded rationality and
willpower. The bureaucrats' livelihood, authority, and status
depend on citizens remaining sufficiently irrational to justify the
bureaucracy's existence.15 7 Consumers are encouraged to register
their complaints with the government, who intercedes on their
behalf. The consumer complaints justify additional regulations to
deter behavioral exploitation. Inevitably, the heavily regulated
firms become de facto state enterprises. As Hayek observed,
"planning leads to dictatorship, because dictatorship is the most
effective instrument of coercion and the enforcement of ideals and,
as such, essential if central planning on a large scale is to be
possible."15 8
Under this worst-case scenario, economic competition ceases
to be a concern. A centrally-planned economy headed by an
authoritarian government eventually displaces experimentation
by private firms and personal liberty. Thus some accept the cost of
behavioral exploitation versus the greater costs of losing economic
freedom to an increasingly authoritarian government. 5 9
But if the government takes a laissez-faire approach and
renounces any intention to regulate the market, this raises the
other worst-case scenario, namely corporate autocracy. Here the
outcome is equally anti-democratic. Economically powerful firms
lobby the government to refrain from regulating the marketplace.
While economically exploiting bounded rational consumers, firms
advocate the virtues of consumer sovereignty under a laissez-faire
NORTH, supra note 41, at 51-52.
F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 70 (U. Chi. Press 2007) (1944).
159 One need only look at China's dismal experience
under Mao Zedong's
authoritarian regime. FENBY, supra note 79, at 525 (besides the human losses and
suffering, estimating the economic cost of the Cultural Revolution at the equivalent of
$34 billion). In defending the economic liberalizations in China's Special Economic
Zones, one Chinese official queried how many state officials would be willing to live in a
zone where leftist policies would be applied through "total state planning, rationing
and queuing for food, where foreign investment and foreigners would be banned, and
inhabitants would not be allowed to travel or send their children abroad." Id. at 648.
157
158
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approach. Under this ideology, markets are presumably efficient
(or heading toward greater efficiency). Once economic power and
wealth are concentrated, the government and its competition
policies are used to preserve the status quo. 160 The dominant
firms maintain their power by redefining the goals of competition
policy. Antitrust enforcement is directed against any potential
countervailing power (such as using the antitrust laws to
prosecute unions, which happened early in the Sherman Act's
historyl61). Antitrust policy characterizes concentration, even to
the brink of monopoly, as beneficial. 162 Political and social
concerns over dominant firms' influence and the effect of their size
on the economy as a whole are dismissed as ill-founded fears over
bigness and prosperity. These non-economic antitrust goals are
deemed out of touch with the latest economic thinking, premised
on rational choice theory. 63 Once economic and political power is
consolidated, monopolies and cartels can become "governmental
instrumentalities to achieve political ends."164 Citizens are denied
the right to use the democratic process to protect them; instead
160 Industries in pre-war Germany, for example, enlisted the state through
compulsory cartel laws to complete their market power. Maurice E. Stucke, Should the
Government Prosecute Monopolies?, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 521-25 (providing examples);
John M. Kleeberg, German Cartels: Myths and Realities 2 (N.Y.U Working Paper),
available
at
http://www.econ.barnard.columbia.edu/-econhist/papers/Kleeberg
GermanCartels.pdf (estimating that 550 to 600 German cartels existed in 1911, about
1,000 in 1922; 1,500 by 1933; and 1,800 by 1938); HAYEK, supra note 158, at 93-94; see
also JOHNSON & KwAK, supra note 7, at 6 (discussing financial industry).
161 The eighth federal antitrust action brought by the United States was against
Eugene V. Debs. COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS: WITH
SUMMARY OF CASES INSTITUTED BY THE UNITED STATES 1890-1951, at 69 (1952). The
United States prosecuted numerous unions and union officials. Id. at 459-60 (index of
cases against unions); see also PAUL E. HADLICK, CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS UNDER THE
SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT 140 (1939) (observing that the first persons to serve jail
sentences resulting from Sherman Act violations were Eugene V. Debs and others,
stemming from the Pullman strike of 1894).
162 Verizon Commc'n Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407
(2004) (praising monopoly profits as "an important element of the free-market system,"
in serving as an inducement to "attract[] 'business acumen' in the first place" and
engage in "risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth").
163 Darren Bush, Too Big to Bail: The Role of Antitrust in Distressed Industries, 77
ANTITRUST L.J. 277, 281-91 (2010).
164

John H. Crider, Roosevelt Calls for Cartels Curb: In Letter to Hull He Says Types

of 'Trusts' Used by Reich Must Be Ended, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1944, at Al (quoting
President Roosevelt).
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they navigate the market's dark alleyways, hoping that little
economic harm comes to them.
2. Scenario II's Policy Risks Assuming the Government Is
Bounded Rational
The prospect of bounded rational consumers and government
raises several additional policy risks. One risk is that competitors
may use consumer protection as a pretext for their anticompetitive
restraints. To "protect" consumers from making irrational
decisions, competitors agree to compete only along some
parameters, such as quality or service, rather than price. In

National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, for
example, the competing engineers refused "to discuss prices with
potential customers until after negotiations . . . resulted in the

initial selection of an engineer." 165 The society claimed that if
engineers discussed prices at the onset with prospective clients,
low bids would result. This in turn would tempt individual
engineers to do inferior work with consequent risk to public safety
and health. The engineers' behavior, when characterized
favorably, was paternalistic. Customers, the engineers argued,
could not account all the variables involved in the projects' actual
performance. 166 The Supreme Court rejected the engineers'
justification.1 6 7 But the bounded rational government, assuming
that bounded rational consumers choose poorly, might accept it.
The rational competitors may also enlist the government to
enforce their cartel.168
165 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
166 Id. at 694 (engineers arguing that customers could not intelligibly decide
whether its "interest in quality-which may embrace the safety of the end productoutweighs the advantages of achieving cost savings by pitting one competitor against
another").
167 Id. at 695 (recognizing its inability (and its lack of authority under the Sherman
Act) to weigh the loss of price competition with the public benefit of preventing inferior
engineering work and insuring ethical behavior, and characterizing engineers'
justifications as "nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman
Act"); see also FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 463 (1986) (rejecting defense
that in competitive information market consumers will "make unwise and even
dangerous choices").
168 An agency empowered by the government to regulate an industry can be more
effective than a private cartel in maintaining a cartel. In United States v. Kentucky
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Another policy risk arises from the overconfidence bias.
Citizens are overconfident in the government's ability to regulate
the market for abuses. 6 9 The bounded rational government is
overconfident in its citizens' ability to fend for themselves1 70 and
the ability of markets to self-correct.
A third policy risk is that the bounded rational government
causes greater harm in protecting bounded rational consumers.
For example, after a recent disaster, bounded rational consumers
and the government under the availability heuristic would
overestimate the probability of that disaster recurring. The
government overregulates the industry, while not addressing
other less salient dangers that actually cause greater harm.171
Even without the government's help, bounded rational consumers

Real Estate Commission, the defendant served as the sole licensing authority for the
state's real estate brokers. Complaint at 12, United States v. Kentucky Real Estate
available at
2005),
Mar. 31,
Ky.
(W.D.
No.
3:05CV188-H
Comm'n,

http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f208300/208393.pdf. Four of the five commissioners
were, as required by statute, active real estate brokers. The defendant banned brokers
from offering homebuyers a cash rebate, such as $1,000, or an inducement, like a free
television, if the buyer used that broker. To enforce its anticompetitive rebate ban, the
defendant investigated alleged violations, asked real estate brokers to inform it when
any competing brokers offered rebates or other inducements, and took disciplinary
action against brokers who offered customers rebates or other inducements, including
suspending or revoking brokers' licenses, imposing monetary fines, issuing reprimands,
and requiring completion of additional academic credit hours. Id. at 33.
169 See FANNIE MAE, THE GROWING DEMAND FOR HOUSING: 2002 FANNIE MAE
NATIONAL HOUSING SURVEY 9 (2002), available at http://www.fanniemae.com/
global/pdf/media/survey/survey2002.pdf.
170 For example, the Federal Trade Commission under the Reagan Administration
limited Section 5 liability of unfair practices to injuries, which consumers could not
reasonably have avoided. FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness, Appended to In re Int'l
Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1070 (1984). As the FTC stated:
Normally we expect the marketplace to be self-correcting, and we rely on
consumer choice-the ability of individual consumers to make their own
private purchasing decisions without regulatory intervention-to govern the
market. We anticipate that consumers will survey the available alternatives,
choose those that are most desirable, and avoid those that are inadequate or
unsatisfactory.
Id. The FTC Statement however recognized some forms of behavioral exploitation, such
as when firms "exercise undue influence over highly susceptible classes of purchasers,
as by promoting fraudulent 'cures' to seriously ill cancer patients." Id.
171 Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
STAN. L. REV. 683, 747-48 (1999).
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can overreact, based on how the issue is framed 172 or to rumors,
causing social losses, a concern China's authorities recently
raised.173

3. Policy Alternatives under Scenario II
Consumers can be worse off when the government (whether
rational or bounded rational) acts or does not act. So, what should
the government do, especially if the extent of its bounded
rationality is unknown?
The government has several options, some less paternalistic
than others, to deter behavioral exploitation while preserving
economic liberty and leaving room for innovation that benefits
consumers.
One well-known behavioral remedy is for the government to
alter existing, or create new, default rules. 174 One recent issue
was that banks were exploiting credit card consumers' propensity
to overspend their assigned credit limits. Suppose the consumer
with bounded willpower sees designer-label shoes on the discount
rack. The consumer has $20 of available credit; the shoes cost
$100. The bank permits the consumer to charge the shoes, but
extracts a high fee. 175 Overdraft fees are also an issue with debit
172 See Marwan Sinaceur et al., Emotional and DeliberativeReactions to a Public
Crisis: Mad Cow Disease in France, 16 PSYCHOL. Sci. 247 (2005), available at
http://faculty-gsb.stanford.edu/heath/documents/PsychSci-Mad%20Cow.pdf.
The field
study showed how French newspaper articles more often featured the emotional label
"Mad Cow" disease than the more abstract and scientific label (Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease, CJD, or bovine spongiform encephalopathy, BSE). Beef consumption dropped
"significantly when many articles mentioned the Mad Cow frame during the previous
month, but was unaffected by the number of articles in the previous month that
mentioned the scientific frames." Id. at 251.
173 Hu Meidong & Peng Yining, Chinese Lacking Scientific Literacy: Knowledge
Crucial to Development and Stability, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 2, 2010, at 4 (expressing
concern over a three hundred percent price increase of mung beans since April 2010
after false claim that beans cure cancer).
174 RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 78 (2008); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler,
LibertarianPaternalismIs Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003); Camerer
et al., supra note 11, at 1211.
175 Marcy Gordon, House Passes Credit Card Bill That Helps Consumers,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 1, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/30/housepasses-credit-card-_n_194126.html. During the financial crisis, the major U.S. banks
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cards, where the consumer makes a purchase for an amount
greater than the balance in the consumer's bank account. In 2009,
consumers paid a record $38.5 billion in overdraft fees, nearly
double the amount reported in 2000.176 Ninety-three percent of
the overdraft revenues came from about fourteen percent of U.S.
bank accounts, with the larger banks charging the highest fees. 7 7
Rather than prohibit outright over-the-limit fees or regulate
the size of such fees, Congress in the Credit CARD Act of 2009
chose a behavioral remedy and changed the default option.178
Before 2010, many banks automatically enrolled consumers in
their over-the-limit plan. Under the Act, the credit card company
cannot impose an over-the-limit fee for any extension of credit in
excess of the previously-authorized credit limit unless the
consumer expressly opts into the over-the-limit plan.179
For rational actors with perfect willpower, the default option
should not affect the outcome. But the majority of surveyed
participants in the Federal Reserve's testing, along with
"consumer advocates, members of Congress, federal and state
raised fees further. Eric Dash, Bank Fees Rise as Lenders Try to Offset Losses, N.Y.
July 2, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/
TIMES,
07/02/business/02fees.html.
176 Saskia Scholtes & Francesco Guerrera, Banks in $38.5bn Windfall from Fees,

FIN. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2009, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/O/b359ffcO-85451lde-9a64-00144feabdcO.html#axzzlcqvXVO8i.
Ron Lieber & Andrew Martin, The Card Game: Overspending on Debit Cards Is
17
a Boon for Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2009, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/09/your-money/credit-and-debit-cards/09debit.html.
178 See Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub.
L. No. 111-24, § 102(a), 123 Stat. 1734, 1738-39 (2009) [hereinafter Credit CARD Act].
With respect to debit cards, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
amended Regulation E to limit the ability of a financial institution to assess an
overdraft fee for paying automated teller machine (ATM) and one-time debit card
transactions that overdraw a consumer's account, unless the consumer affirmatively
consents, or opts in, to the institution's payment of overdrafts for these transactions.

New Overdraft Rules for Debit and ATM Cards, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RESERVE SYs. (June 22, 2010), http://www.federalreserve.gov/consumerinfo/wyntkoverdraft.htm.
179 Credit CARD Act § 102(a), supra note 178. This provision, like many other
provisions of the Act, took effect in February 2010. See id. at § 3, 123 Stat. at 1735. One
year after the default option changed, "overlimit fees have virtually disappeared in the
credit card industry." CARD Act Factsheet, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Feb. 2011),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/credit-cards/credit-card-act/feb20l 1-factsheet/
[hereinafter CFPB Factsheet].
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regulators, and the overwhelming majority of individual
consumers who commented" on the proposed regulation urged the
Board to set the default as consumers having to opt into the
overdraft program rather than having to opt-out (which many
banks preferred).1 80 Default options have played an important role
in diverse settings,18 including class actions,1 82 and will likely be
contested in other areas. 8 3
As a second option, the government can require consumers to
choose among the options. The European Commission, for
example, challenged Microsoft for bundling or tying its web
browser, Internet Explorer, to its dominant client personal
computer operating system, Windows. 184 Before the settlement,
consumers who used Windows had Microsoft's Internet Explorer
as their default web browser. Although consumers could download
other browsers, many did not, a function not attributable
necessarily to the superiority of Microsoft's browser but status quo
180 See Electronic Funds Transfers, 12 C.F.R. Part 205 (2009), available at
(Official staff commentary of the
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/E9-27474.htm
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
181 See, e.g., Stefano DellaVigna, Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the
Field, 47 J. EcON. LITERATURE 315, 322 n.11 (2009) (collecting studies on default
options in retirement savings, contractual choice in health-clubs, organ donation, and
car insurance plan choice); Eric J. Johnson et al., Defaults, Framingand Privacy: Why
Opting In-Opting Out, 13 MARKETING LETTERS 5 (2003) (consent to receive e-mail
marketing); C. Whan Park et al., Choosing What I Want Versus Rejecting What I Do
Not Want: An Application of Decision Framing to Product Option Choice Decisions, 37
J. MARKETING RES. 187 (2000) (car option purchases); THALER & SUNSTEIN, NUDGE,
supra note 174, at 129-30.
182 EUROPEAN CONSUMER CONSULTATIVE GRP., OPINION ON PRIVATE DAMAGES
ACTIONS 4 (2010), available at http://ec.europa.eulconsumers/empowerment/docs/
recent
(noting
Europe's
ECCG opinion on actionsfor damages18112010.pdf
experience that the rate of participation in opt-in procedure for consumer claims was
less than one percent, whereas under opt-out regimes, rates are typically very high
(97% in the Netherlands and almost 100% in Portugal)).
18s See Julie Brill, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Remarks at the Trans
27,
2010),
available
at
Dialogue
4
(Apr.
Atlantic
Consumer
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/brill/100427tacdspeech.pdf (expressing dissatisfaction with
the "traditional opt-out, 'notice and choice' model" that "inappropriately places the
burden on consumers to read and understand lengthy, complicated privacy policies that
almost no one reads, and no one understands").
184 Press Release, European Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission Welcomes Microsoft's
Roll-Out of Web Browser Choice (Mar. 2, 2010), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/216&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN.
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bias.1 85 As part of its settlement, Microsoft now provides
consumers a Browser Choice Screen. Rather than having one
Internet browser as the default, computer users must choose the
browser they want from the competing web browsers listed on the
screen. 186
Third, the government can educate the consumers using
framing under prospect theory1 8 7 and the availability heuristic. 188
To increase the salience of credit card finance charges, for
example, the Credit CARD Act of 2009 requires a "Minimum
Payment Warning." 8 9 The credit card consumer is told in the
185

See Shane Frederick, Automated Choice Heuristics, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES:

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 555 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002)

(summarizing experimental evidence of people preferring current options over other
options to a degree that is difficult to justify).
186 It is unclear how successful the settlement has been to date. On the one hand,
Microsoft's share of the European browser market declined after the settlement-from
44.9% in January 2010 to 39.8% in October 2010. In 2009, Microsoft's share declined by
5.5 percentage points; in 2008, by 8 points. Kevin J. O'Brien, European Antitrust Deal
With Microsoft Barely Affects Browser Market, N.Y.TIMES.COM (Oct. 10, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/11/technology/1leubrowser.html?ref-business. So, the
market share could have declined absent the remedy. On the other hand, absent the
remedy, by enabling consumers to easily chose which browser they desire, increases
the likelihood that the market share reflects more the consumers' informed choice,
rather than the monopolist's. Emanuele Ciriolo, Behavioural Economics in the
European Commission: Past, Present and Future, OXERA AGENDA, Jan. 2011, at 3,
available at http://www.oxera.com/main.aspx?id=9324 (noting how twenty-five percent
of the consumers who viewed the choice screen chose an alternative browser).
187 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).
1ss Camerer et al., supra note 11, at 1231 ("Since low probabilities are so difficult to
represent cognitively, it may help to use graphical devices, metaphors (imagine
choosing one ping-pong ball out of a large swimming pool filled with balls), or relativeodds comparisons (winning the lottery is about as likely as being struck by lightning in
the next week).").
189 Credit CARD Act, supra note 178, at § 201(a). One year later, the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau reports that "70 percent of cardholders [surveyed] have
noticed that monthly statements now contain information about the consequences of
making only minimum payments" and "48 percent of consumers recall that their bill
now tells them how much to pay each month in order to pay off the balance within
three years." CFPB Factsheet, supra note 179. "Of the cardholders who have noticed at
least one of the changes in their monthly billing statements, 60 percent say that their
monthly statements are easier to read and understand than they were a year ago" and
"31 percent of cardholders who recall seeing the new information on their statement
report that this information has caused them either to increase the payments they
make or to reduce their use of credit." Id. However, "32 percent of those who carry a
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monthly statement how paying only the minimum amount due
will increase the amount of interest she pays and the time to
repay the balance. At times, better disclosures entail providing
less, but more important, information. 190
A fourth option to deter behavioral exploitation is to set one
option as the default but impose procedural constraints on opting
out. 9 1 For example, the Credit CARD Act of 2009 sets as the
default that "no credit card may be issued to, or open end
consumer credit plan established by or on behalf of," consumers
under the age of twenty-one.1 92 To open a credit card account,
those under twenty-one must: (i) have the signature of a cosigner,
including the parent, legal guardian, spouse, or any other
individual over twenty-one years old who has the means to repay
(and be jointly liable for) the credit card debts; or (ii) submit
financial information showing their independent means of
repaying any obligation arising from the proposed extension of
credit. 193
A fifth option is to afford purchasers a cooling-off period.
Consumers in an emotional, impulsive state can make unwise
decisions that they later regret.194 Federal and state laws along
with regulations recognize this.es From a behavioral economics
perspective, the effectiveness of cooling off periods is mixed. On
the one hand, consumers, upon reflection, can reconsider a
balance from month to month say they do not know how much interest they paid on
their primary credit card last year." Id.
190 LACKO, supra note 141 (finding that the current mortgage cost disclosures failed
to convey key mortgage costs to consumers, and the tested disclosure prototype
improved the surveyed consumers' understanding, especially for more complex loans).
191 Sunstein & Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, supra note
174, at 1189. Besides procedural constraints, they propose substantive constraints that
allow people "to reject the default arrangement, but not on whatever terms they
choose." Id.
192 Credit CARD Act, supra note 178, at § 301.
193 Id.
194 See Samuel M. McClure et al., Separate Neural Systems Value Immediate &
Delayed Monetary Rewards, SCl., Oct. 13, 2004, at 503-07; ARIELY, supra note 116, at
89-126.
195 See Rule Concerning Cooling-Off Period for Sales Made at Homes or at Certain
Other Locations, 16 C.F.R. Part 429 (2011); Camerer et al., supra note 11, at 1241-44
(collecting federal and state cooling-off statutes); see also Truth in Lending (Regulation
Z), 12 C.F.R. § 226.15 (2011) (Regulation Z cooling-off period).
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purchase, especially one involving high-pressure sale tactics. On
the other hand, the more time one has to complete a task, the
behavioral economics literature suggests, the greater the
likelihood one will not complete that task. 196 For example, a
customer's likelihood of redeeming a rebate may be inversely
proportional to the rebate period's length. 9 7 Consumers assume
that they eventually will seek the "discount," but ultimately
procrastinate.
A sixth option is to impose a behavioral exploitation tax on
the rational firm.1 98 When the estimated social value of the
rational firms' behavior is below its private value, the government
can tax the rational firm the difference. The tax seeks to prevent
the firms from unjustly enriching themselves from their
behavioral exploitation. For example, revenues from payday
lending that come from APRs above a certain level would be taxed
at higher rates. Credit card revenues earned from late fees would
be taxed at higher rates than revenue from annual fees.
A seventh option is for the government to take preventive
measures to help consumers debias themselves and improve their
willpower. Here, the aim is to make consumers less susceptible to
behavioral exploitation.19 9 The government can increase: (i) the
supply of debiasing methods (e.g., adding courses on financial
literacy in high school (emphasizing the behavioral risks and
investors' susceptibility to overconfidence biaS2 0 0)); (ii) the demand
196 See, e.g., Dan Ariely & Klaus Wertenbroch, Procrastination,Deadlines, and
Performance: Self-Control by Precommitment, 13 PSYCHOL. Sci. 219, 219-24 (2002);
Amos Tversky & Eldar Shafir, Choice Under Conflict: The Dynamics of Deferred
Decisions, 3 PSYCHOL. ScI. 358 (1992).
197 Matthew A. Edwards, The Law, Marketing and Behavioral Economics of
Consumer Rebates, 12 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 362, 391-95 (2007); see also Virginia
2009),
(May
ATLANTIC
Economy,
Gift-Card
The
Postrel,
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/05/the-gift-card-economy/7372/
(noting the longer the expiration period, the less likely one will redeem gift card).
& Matthew Rabin, Studying Optimal Paternalism,
198 See Ted O'Donoghue
Illustrated by a Model of Sin Taxes, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 186 (2003).
199 Gregory Mitchell, LibertarianPaternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 Nw. U. L. REV.
1245, 1264 (2005) (exploring how "the first approach of the libertarian central planner
would be to debias individuals so that they can make their own rational decisions about
which choices best promote their own welfare").
200 Financial literacy efforts have had mixed results. One study of Harvard
undergraduate students and MBA students from Wharton, for example, found a "low
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for debiasing, such as imposing procedural constraints on
consumer participation in high risk areas of behavioral
exploitation, such as subprime lending, unless the consumer
participated in an approved online course that outlines the
material risks; and (iii) the opportunities to debias, such as
facilitating timely feedback mechanisms to make consumers
become aware of their errors and the costs of their poor choices,
and strategies to avoid errors (e.g., providing employees who have
not enrolled into a retirement plan a monthly reminder of how
much money they lost to date in matching funds by not
contributing to the 401(k), and an easy method to opt-in). The
government can also provide consumers, if the market has not,
commitment devices.
An eighth option is to increase the firms' search costs of
identifying potential victims. One resounding success of the
Federal Trade Commission is enabling consumers to easily opt-out
of all unwanted telephone solicitations. 20 The government,
through a similar common listing service, can enable consumers to
opt-out of home or mail solicitations (including credit card
offerings) or easily block home-shopping cable stations. The
government can increase consumers' privacy rights to make it
harder for firms to identify especially bounded rational consumers
through their purchasing behavior.
Some argue that "[a]dvocating soft paternalism is akin to
advocating an increased role of the incumbent government as an
agent of persuasion." 2 0 2 Scenario II's policy risks indeed represent
a balancing act. While government persuasion increases the risk
of authoritarianism, government inaction carries the risks of
behavioral exploitation and corporate autocracy. Moreover, anti-

absolute level of financial sophistication" with subjects basing choices on normatively
irrelevant mutual fund attributes. James J. Choi et al., Why Does the Law of One Price
Fail? An Experiment on Index Mutual Funds 25 (Yale ICF Working Paper No. 08-14,
Mar. 6, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1125023.
201 See, e.g., Telemarketing Rules, 15 U.S.C. § 6102 (2006); National Do-Not-Call
Registry, 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B) (2011). As of September 30, 2008, over 172.5
million telephone numbers were on the do-not-call list. See also Do-Not-Call
Improvement Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-187, 122 Stat. 633 (2008) (telephone
numbers placed on the National Do-Not-Call-Registry can remain on it permanently).
202 Glaeser, supra note 107, at 156.
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"soft" paternalism can itself be paternalistic. If most consumers
(like those in the Federal Reserve's testing) prefer having the
default as an opt-in (e.g., requiring consumers to opt into the
banks' overdraft programs), then assuming that consumers are
indeed sovereign, the banks should comply. If the banks, however,
are unresponsive to consumer demand and require consumers to
opt-out, why cannot citizens seek from their elected
representatives to get what they want? It is hard to see why
citizens, in the name of libertarianism, must continue to wait for
their desired default option from an unresponsive market.
Accordingly, under any conception of competition with
bounded rational consumers, one cannot view antitrust and
consumer protection as unrelated. Under Scenario II, both
consumer protection and antitrust law promote the opportunity
for informed consumer choices. Ideally, informed consumers
choose among the innovating firms' solutions for their
problems. 203 Given the importance of individual autonomy in
overall well-being, the government must carefully delineate
between behavioral exploitation and behavioral freedom, where
firms help consumers address their bounded rationality and
willpower. After all, it would be counterproductive if antitrust
policy promotes diversity of products and services and the process
of search and experimentation, while consumer protection law
bans all products except the one the government believes is the
best. Ideally, antitrust and consumer protection laws deter market
failure (e.g., systemic behavioral exploitation) and ensure that
consumers, once informed, can choose among products and
services.

203

Wolfgang Kerber, Competition, Innovation and MaintainingDiversity Through

Competition Law,

in ECONOMIC APPROACHES TO COMPETITION LAW: FOUNDATIONS AND

LIMITATIONS (Josef Drex1 et al. eds., 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1543725.
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C. Scenario III: Bounded Rational Firms and Rational
Consumers
Here consumers are relatively more rational than firms in
the industry. 204 Excessive optimism can have procompetitive
benefits, such as the firms' willingness to innovate and enter new
markets. 205 But excessive optimism can harm the firms and
economy. Consumers, in response to the firms' behavior, ask,
"What were they thinking?" One recurring theme in the business
literature is how once mighty firms (e.g., the U.S. car
manufacturers 206) lose sight of their customers' needs or are in
denial.207
This Scenario helps explain why some corporate executives,
with much to lose, risk criminal liability by fixing prices with their

204 For Scenarios III and IV, one must also distinguish between the firms' and
economists' conception of rationality. See, e.g., Russell Pittman, Who Are You Calling
Irrational?Marginal Costs, Variable Costs, and the Pricing Practices of Firms, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div. (Economic Analysis Group, Discussion Paper No. 09-3
July 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/eag/248394.pdf (noting this
disconnect as to pricing decisions). Some economists view marginal costs narrowly, and
deem business executives who take fixed and sunk costs into account in their pricing
decisions as naive. But as Pittman points out, in the long-run, a firm's revenues must
cover not only its operating costs but its invested capital. Id. at 2. "Setting price equal
to average variable cost, with no 'margin' for fixed costs, is a strategy for firms exiting a
market, not for long-term survival." Id. at 5. Thus, a profit-maximizing firm produces
where its MC (marginal cost) = AVC (average variable cost) + FC (fixed cost) / Q
(quantity). Firms may also engage in other conduct that economists deem as
"irrational," but which consumers deem as fair. Some economists are agnostic on price
discrimination or believe that in certain instances it may be pro-competitive; ninetyone percent of individuals in one survey thought charging higher prices to those who
are more dependent on the product was offensive. Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as
a Constrainton Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 735
(1986). So, even though firms could price discriminate, some may decline, so as to not
offend their customers.
205 See Don A. Moore et al., What Competition? Myopic Self-Focus in Market-Entry
Decisions, 18 ORG. SCI. 440, 441-42 (2007); Langevoort, supra note 69, at 11.
206 John E. Kwoka, Jr., The U.S. Industry Under Duress: Fit, or Finished?, 5

COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 49 (2009).
207 See, e.g., RICHARD S. TEDLOW, DENIAL: WHY BUSINESS LEADERS FAIL TO LOOK
FACTS IN THE FACE-AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (2010); StrategicDecisions: When Can

Mar.
Trust Your Gut?, MCKINSEY Q.,
You
www.mckinseyquarterly.com/Strategic-decisionsWhen

2010, available at http://
can-youtrust-your-gut_2557.
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competitors; 208 are likely to advocate a merger; 20 9 are
overconfident about a merger's likely efficiencies; 2 10 overvalue the
purchased assets; 21 1 are overly confident or pessimistic about
their chances of entering particular markets; 212 and consistent
with the sunk cost fallacy, throw good money after bad in
corporate projects. 213
Professor Waller recently examined evidence from corporate
finance that suggests entire categories of mergers are more likely
to destroy, rather than enhance, shareholder value.214 Among the
201 Maurice E. Stucke, Am I a Price-Fixer? A Behavioral Economics Analysis of
Cartels, in CRIMINALISING CARTELS: A CRITICAL INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY OF AN
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY MOVEMENT (Caron Beaton-Wells & Ariel Ezrachi eds.,
2011).
209 Ulrike Malmendier, A "New" Paradigm in Corporate Finance: The Role of
Managers and Managerial Biases, 4 NBER REPORTER 13, 15-16 (2010), available at
http://www.nber.org/reporter/2010number4/ulrike.html (discussing correlation between
overconfidence and acquisitions by cash-rich firms not dependent on external
financing).
210 See, e.g., ROBERT F. BRUNER, DEALS FROM HELL: M&A LESSONS THAT RISE
ABOVE THE ASHES (2005) (summarizing major failed mergers); Matthew T. Billett &
Yiming Qian, Are Overconfident CEOs Born or Made? Evidence of Self Attribution Bias
from Frequent Acquirers, 54 MGMT. SCl. 1037 (2008) (finding from sample of public
acquisitions between 1985 and 2002 that CEOs who previously engaged in a successful
acquisition appear to overly attribute their role in successful deals, leading to more
deals even though these subsequent deals are value destructive).
211 Mathew L.A. Hayward & Donald C. Hambrick, Explaining the Premiums Paid
for Large Acquisitions: Evidence of CEO Hubris, 42 ADMIN. SCl. Q. 103, 122 (1997)
(finding from empirical study of mergers over $100 million involving publicly traded
firms over four year period that CEO hubris plays a substantial role in acquisition
process and acquisitions tend to reduce shareholder wealth); see also RICHARD H.
THALER, WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 50-62 (1992)
(discussing experimental and field evidence); Mauricio R. Delgado et al.,
UnderstandingOverbidding Using the Neural Circuitry of Reward to Design Economic
Auctions, SCI., Sept. 26, 2008, at 1849; Mackintosh, supra note 129, at 15 (discussing a
2010 auction of a $20 bill for $61).
212 Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke, BehavioralAntitrust, 86 IND. L.J. 1527,
1559 (2011) (discussing increasing interest in behavioral economics and its applications
to competition law); Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in
the Twenty-First Century, 38 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 513 (2007).
213 Malcolm Baker et al., Behavioral Corporate Finance:A Survey, in HANDBOOK OF
CORPORATE FINANCE: EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 172 (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 2007);
Hal R. Arkes & Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of Sunk Cost, 35 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HuM. DECISION PROCESSES 124, 124-40 (1985).
214 Spencer Weber Waller, Corporate Governance and Competition Policy, 18 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 833 (2011); Pittman, supra note 204, at 215-19 (discussing empirical
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well-known biases and heuristics relevant to the decision to enter
in mergers and acquisitions, which frequently result in value
destroying transactions, include "myopia, loss aversion,
endowment effects, status quo bias, extremeness aversion, overoptimism, hindsight bias, anchoring heuristics, availability
heuristics, framing effects, representative bias, saliency effects,
and others." 215 Executives, in behavioral studies, were
overconfident in their ability to manage a company, systematically
underestimated their competitors' strength, and were prone to
self-serving interpretations of reality (e.g., taking credit for
positive outcomes and blaming the environment for negative
outcomes).26

Scenario III in theory should be of less concern. Absent a
natural monopoly or high entry barriers, rational consumers
should take their business elsewhere. The critical assumption is
that when bounded rational firms, unlike their rational profitmaximizing counterparts, are overoptimistic concerning a
merger's efficiencies, overconfident in their escaping detection for
their cartel activities, and more or less risk averse in entering a
new market, they quickly bear the cost of their miscalculation.
The market swiftly punishes the bounded rationality. The firm
either improves its decision-making or is eliminated.
But this is not always true. As the financial crisis reflects,
many Wall Street firms were not swiftly punished (or their
executives ever punished) for their bounded rationality. 217 Thus,

literature that stockholders of acquiring firms do not benefit or do not benefit much
from mergers).
215 Waller, supra note 214, at 878.
216 Colin F. Camerer & Ulrike Malmendier, Behavioral Economics of Organizations,
in BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS 235, 246, 260-64 (Peter Diamond &
Hannu Vartiainen eds., 2007). For several recent surveys of the empirical literature see
Langevoort, supra note 69, at 73-77; Mark Armstrong & Steffen Huck, Behavioral
Economics as Applied to Firms: A Primer, 6 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 2 (2010); and
Christoph Engel, The Behaviour of Corporate Actors: A Survey of the Empirical
Literature 7-8 (Max Planck Inst. for Res. on Collective Goods, Preprint No. 2008/23,
Feb. 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1135184.
217 See, e.g., Avishalom Tor & William J. Rinner, Behavioral Antitrust: A New
Approach to the Rule of Reason after Leegin, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 805, 839 (2011)
(noting how some bounded rational manufacturers will overuse resale price
maintenance, and as the historical evidence and behavioral research reveal, "the
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one cannot assume that corporate behavior is as, if not more,
rational than consumer behavior.
1. Scenario III's Policy Implications Assuming the Government
Is Rational
One cannot say that the government is always less rational
than private firms. With politically accountable elected
representatives from different communities, a legislature can see
what firms and individuals in any community cannot. 21 8 The
government is not always more rational than its firms or citizens.
But the legislature has a unique vantage. As President Roosevelt
wrote in recommending the strengthening and enforcement of the
antitrust laws, the larger and more important question involves
honest citizens "who cannot see the social and economic
consequences of their actions in a modern economically
interdependent community." 219
If private firms are less rational than consumers and the
government, then one risk under Scenario III is that the
government will seek to run the marketplace like a government
bureaucracy. The government may seek to displace bounded
rational firms with state-owned enterprises or regulate the firms
with the goal "to organize the whole national economy like the
postal system." 220 The government could become less rational, and
the resulting risks (including authoritarianism) and societal
welfare loss from government's central planning may far exceed
the losses from the firms' bounded irrationality.
Instead of central planning, a rational government should
return to first principles. It should inquire why consumers did not
efficacy of repeated decisions, organizations, and market pressure in correcting
manufacturer bias is limited").
218 See Essay 10 of the Federalist, in THE ESSENTIAL FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS 173 (David Wootton ed., 2003).
219 Message from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Congress Transmitting
Recommendations Relative to the Strengthening and Enforcement of Antitrust Laws,
Apr. 29. 1938, S. Doc. No. 173, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1938), reprinted in 4 EARL W.
KINTNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED
STATUTES 3408 (1978).
220 MISES, supra note 66, at xvi (quoting LENIN, STATE AND REVOLUTION 44, 83-84
(Int'l Publishers 1932) (1917)).
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(or could not) punish the bounded rational firm. When consumers
are sovereign, private firms have a strong incentive to debias in
order to gain a competitive advantage and avoid consumer
punishment. 221 Scenario III's policy implications differ from
Scenario II's. Under Scenario II, it makes sense at times to
insulate rational firms from consumers' bounded rationality and
willpower (such as promoting the firm's incentives to maximize
long-term value and economic efficiency, contrary to the pressures
of bounded rational investors to maximize the stock price in the
short-term). 222 Under Scenario III, in contrast, it makes sense at
times to expose bounded rational firms to market demands. 223 The
government should identify and eliminate protective barriers (e.g.,
high import tariffs) or subsidies that reduce the firms' incentives
to debias. 2 24
One incentive to debias is the prospect of failure and market
225
Suppose a bounded rational firm, overconfident in its risk
exit.
assessment models, becomes more leveraged. Ideally, industry
regulators, creditors, and shareholders monitor the bounded
rational firm to prevent such over-leveraging. But if the bounded
rational firm is deemed too big (or important) to fail, the dynamics
change. A dominant firm has greater incentive (and freedom) to
take excessive risks. Rational investors know of the firm's implicit
government guarantee. Its shareholders and creditors will not
punish this risk-taking: when the risky investments work in the
firm's favor, they benefit. When the risky investments fail, the
government's implicit guarantee forecloses the possibility of
market exit. 2 2 6 The government guarantee itself has value, which

221
222
223

Langevoort, supra note 69, at 66-67.
Baker et al., supra note 213, at 148.

Id.

Another possibility is that the managerial decisions are infrequent and do not
provide clear feedback to managers, shareholders, and consumers. Camerer &
Malmendier, supra note 216, at 258.
225 In addition, there is the principal/agent problem. Managers have the incentive to
take on large risks, when there is no downside to them personally. If the risky venture
succeeds, the manager benefits from the increase in value to the firm and their
compensation. If the risky venture fails, the managers may have already left the firm
or leave with a golden parachute. CASSIDY, supra note 86, at 291.
226 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 7, at 204.
224
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can reduce the firm's borrowing costs. 2 2 7 The too-big-and-integralto-fail firms thus enjoy a competitive advantage over smaller
rivals, which are allowed to fail.2 28 Smaller firms cannot
undertake such risk and cannot profit accordingly when the bets
pay off. Without a government guarantee, the smaller firms incur
higher costs to borrow money. Indeed, one criticism is that after
the crisis, U.S. financial institutions increased their market power
by acquiring competitors (such as Bank of America absorbing
Merrill Lynch and Countrywide, JPMorgan Chase acquiring Bear
Stearns and Washington Mutual, and Wells Fargo acquiring
Wachovia), while nonbank mortgage lenders exited the
marketplace. 229 So, smaller banks have a greater incentive to
merge where they too become too-big-and-integral-to-fail.
Consequently, overconfidence, especially for firms less
dependent on lending intermediaries, can motivate merger
activity, under Scenario III. Accordingly, rational competition
officials would display: (i) greater skepticism over the likely
efficiencies of otherwise problematic mergers; 230 (ii) greater
concern over the systemic risks posed by the mergers; and (iii)
greater concern, than they have in recent decades, over the
likelihood and magnitude of false negatives rather than false
positives in merger review.

227 Id.
at 180-81 (noting that during the crisis, large banks could borrow money at
rates 0.78 percentage points more cheaply than smaller banks, which was higher than
the average differential of 0.29 percentage points between 2000 and 2007).
228 STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at 166; see also Mervyn King, Governor, Bank of Eng.,
Speech to the Scottish Business Organizations (Oct. 20, 2009), available at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech406.pdf
("Encouraging banks to take risks that result in large dividend and remuneration
payouts when things go well, and losses for taxpayers when they don't," remarked the
Governor of the Bank of England, "distorts the allocation of resources and management
of risk.").
229 JOHNSON & KwAK, supra note 7, at 171-72, 180 (noting how those three banks
and Citibank controlled half the market for new mortgages, and two-thirds of the
market for new credit cards).
230 Waller, supra note 214, at 873-74 (noting how corporate finance literature
suggests that "mega-mergers on a stock for stock basis between roughly equal
competitors are highly likely to destroy shareholder value").
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2. Scenario III's Policy Implications Assuming the Government
Is Bounded Rational
One risk is that the bounded rational government,
overconfident in its understanding of competition, relies on
empirically suspect assumptions. In presuming that firms are as
rational as consumers, the government's theory of competition
resembles Scenario I, when empirically it resembles Scenarios III
or IV. The government's mergers policies accordingly are too
lenient while its prosecutions of price-fixers are too severe.
One concern is that the government, when confronted with
evidence of firms' bounded rationality, either attempts to justify
the behavior under rational choice theory, or if no explanation
exists, ignores it. For example, the U.S. Horizontal Merger
Guidelines assume that market participants behave as rational
profit-maximizers. 23 1 Accordingly, sustained market power is not
theoretically feasible where entry barriers are low. 23 2 Antitrust
policy assumes that: (i) supra-competitive prices will attract
rational profit-maximizing firms into markets characterized with
low entry barriers; (ii) the new entrants will replenish the lost
output; and (iii) as a result, prices will return closer to marginal
cost. Operating under the false impression that market
participants, pursuing their economic interests, will self-police
and regulate, the government will be more concerned about the
risk of false positives than negatives from their enforcement
activity, especially in markets characterized with moderate to low
entry barriers.23 3
But under Scenario III, contrary to the guidelines'
hypothesis, firms do not always enter markets with low entry
barriers to defeat the exercise of market power.234 Nor does a
bounded rational government inquire why price-fixing occurs in

HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 61, at § 1.0.
Id. at § 9.0; Ball Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1335
(7th Cir. 1986) (noting that "the lower the barriers to entry, and the shorter the lags of
new entry, the less power existing firms have").
233 Kara Scannell & Sudeep Reddy, Greenspan Admits Errors to Hostile House
Panel, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2008, at Al, available at http://online.wsj.com/articlel
SB122476545437862295.html.
234 Reeves & Stucke, supra note 212, at 1554-56.
231
232
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markets with low entry barriers. 235 Instead, the government seeks
to reconcile this non-entry with its flawed economic theory (e.g.,
markets that "superficially" appear to have low entry barriers,
actually are more difficult to enter, so rational profit-maximizing
firms accurately discerned that entry would have been
unprofitable at pre-merger levels). 236
While too lenient in merger review, the bounded rational
government, relying on optimal deterrence theory, can be too
punitive in its criminal antitrust prosecutions. This too can harm
consumers. The government erroneously believes that price-fixers,
under Scenario III, behave as rational profit-maximizers. To deter
cartels, optimal deterrence theory posits that the penalty should
equal at least the violation's expected net harm to others (plus
enforcement costs) divided by the probability of detection and
proof of the violation. 231 Setting the antitrust penalty at this
optimal level, in theory, should result in the socially optimal level
of price-fixing.
Faced with evidence of durable cartels and high recidivism, a
bounded rational government, under optimal deterrence theory,
can increase either: (i) the probability of detection (which is
difficult with an already generous amnesty program to induce
price-fixers to implicate their co-conspirators); or (ii) the criminal
(and/or civil) penalties, which presumably are sub-optimal in
deterring cartels. The problem is if the antitrust penalties are
already at (or above) the optimal level. Bounded rational firms fix
prices, not because the antitrust fines are too low, but due to
situational (e.g., industry norms) and dispositional (e.g.,
executives' overconfidence in escaping detection) factors. The
235

Id.

This ex post justification is a difference in perception-what seems like easy
markets to profitably enter (such as turtles) are actually quite difficult. But this raises
the accuracy of competition agencies (typically their paralegals and new lawyers) in
screening thousands of HSR merger filings annually. How will they distinguish high
and low entry barriers? Thus, a bounded rational government official can seek to
explain ex post the lack of entry that is consistent with rational choice theory, but the
issue is predicting entry ex ante.
237 Gary S. Becker, Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior, 101 J.
POL. EcoN. 385, 389-90 (1993); see also Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An
Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968); William M. Landes, Optimal
Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 652, 656, 666-68 (1983).
236
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bounded rational government fails to recognize this possibility.
Rather than address these situational and dispositional factors
through a pluralism of mechanisms, such as criminal and civil
penalties, structural means (improved merger review), and
informal norms that highlight price-fixing's ethical and moral
implications,2 3 8 the government instead continues to increase the
penalties, under the belief they are suboptimal. Excessive fines
can harm consumers when they cause firms to reduce investments
in innovation and raise prices. If firms cannot absorb or otherwise
pass along the fines as higher prices, then the firms either
reorganize under the bankruptcy laws or exit the market, which
as a consequence has fewer meaningful competitors. 239

D. Scenario IV- Bounded Rational Firmsand Consumers
Under this last scenario, many market participants have
bounded rationality and willpower. Biases and heuristics are
systemic. At closer inspection, competition under Scenario IV is
better viewed as a discovery process than a stable equilibrium.
Bounded rational firms have imperfect knowledge about current
and future consumer preferences, a blurred and changing
understanding of their goals and preferences, and a limited
repertoire of actions to cope with whatever problems they face. 24 0
Bounded rational consumers have changing and, at times,

238

See EUROPEAN COMM'N, DG COMPETITION STAKEHOLDER STUDY: AGGREGATE

REPORT 8 (July 2010), available at http://ec.europa.eulcompetition/publications/
reports/aggregate report en.pdf (Conducted by TNS Qual+ at the request of European
Commission Directorate General for Competition, noting that a "number of
stakeholders across all groups stressed that, while fines are an effective deterrent, they
are not the only tool available to DG Competition. A number of alternatives were
suggested (criminal sanctions, publication of the companies' infringements,
compensation payments for harmed consumers, etc.) but with mixed views about
whether individual criminal liability should be introduced as an additional deterrent.");
Int'l Competition Network Working Grp. on Cartels, Defining Hard Core Cartel
Conduct: Effective Institutions,Effective Penalties, in BUILDING BLOCKS FOR EFFECTIVE
ANTI-CARTEL REGIMES (2005), available at http://www.internationalcompetition
(noting additional ways of achieving
network.org/uploads/library/doc346.pdf
deterrence, including press coverage).
239Maurice E. Stucke, Morality and Antitrust, 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 443, 481.
240 Giovanni Dosi & Luigi Marengo, On the Evolutionary and Behavioral Theories of
Organizations:A Tentative Roadmap, 18 ORG. SCl. 491, 492, 494 (2007).
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inconsistent preferences. 24 1 For example, they demand more
choices than they actually prefer. 242 Bounded rational firms
comply, leading to suboptimal results for consumers2 4 3 and
firms. 244

241 See, e.g., Richard Layard, Happiness & Public Policy: A Challenge to the
Profession, 116 ECON. J. C24, C24 (2006) (noting from happiness economic literature
how "tastes are not given-the happiness we get from what we have is largely
culturally determined"); Steven C. Michael & Tracy Pun Palandjian, Organizational
Learning and New Product Introductions, 21 J. PROD. INNOVATION MGMT. 268, 270
(2004) (discussing shampoo industry dynamism where consumers with changing tastes
seek variety).
242 Under Scenario I, providing rational consumers more choices is generally
beneficial. Rational firms target consumers' particular needs and tastes more
accurately with more choices. Market forces should set the optimal amount of choice.
Rational manufacturers will supply (when profitable) products that satisfy the desired
mix of price, performance, and other attributes. But under Scenario IV, more options
do not always increase welfare. Under Scenario IV, bounded rational consumers may
demand additional options and seek to preserve existing options. In one computer
experiment conducted by Professor Ariely, participants tried to keep options open even
when counter-productive. In the Door Game, each MIT student could click on three
doors on the computer screen to find the room with the biggest payoff (between $0.01
and $0.10). Each student was given 100 clicks, and could click one door as many times
possible without a penalty. Each time the student sampled another door, that switch
cost the student one additional click. Experiment Two, the Disappearing Door Game,
was the same as the Door Game except each time a door was left unvisited for twelve
clicks, it disappeared forever. To keep options open, participants in Experiment Two
ended up making substantially less money (about fifteen percent less) than
participants in Experiment One. Participants would have made more money by
sticking to one door. A similar result occurred when participants were told the exact
monetary outcome they could expect from each room. ARIELY, supra note 116, at 14248.
242 Some bounded rational consumers, faced with many choices, avoid choosing any
option, even when the choice of opting out has negative consequences for future wellbeing. Simona Botti & Sheena S. Iyengar, The Dark Side of Choice: When Choice
Impairs Social Welfare, 25 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 24, 26 (2006) (discussing
information overload, where an increase in options raises the cognitive costs in
comparing and evaluating the options and leads to suboptimal decision strategies).
Other bounded rational consumers choose an option, but have lower confidence in their
choice and greater dissatisfaction in choosing.
244 The bounded rational firms, as a result, lose sales opportunities of their
products. Iyengar and Lepper, in their famous experiment, set up a tasting booth in an
upscale grocery store. The booth displayed either six or twenty-four different flavors of
jam. A greater percentage of the shoppers stopped to sample one of the displayed jams
when the booth had twenty-four jam flavors (sixty percent versus forty percent when
booth displayed six jam flavors). But a lower percentage actually purchased a jar of jam
(three percent versus thirty percent of customers when booth had only six flavors).
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Scenario IV competition is an "evolutionary trial and error
process, in which the firms try out different problem solutions and
can learn from the feedback of the market, which of their specific
products and technological solutions are the superior ones." 2 4 5
Rather than an end-state capable of being perfected, competition
is a continuous process "in which previously unknown knowledge
is generated," and "the multiplicity and diversity of the (parallel
trials of the) firms might be crucial for the effectiveness of
competition as a discovery procedure." 246 Firms and consumers
make mistakes, readjust, and undertake new strategies. The
competitive process "is inherently a process of trial and error with
no stable end-state considered by the participants in the
process." 247
Scenario IV involves several important competitive
dimensions beyond price. First, bounded rational firms compete in
the ways they debias themselves. 248 Firms (like consumers) can
improve (or regress) in their decision-making and willpower. 249
The ways in which companies learn, accomplish tasks, and deal

Sheena S. lyengar & Mark R. Lepper, When Choice Is Demotivating: Can One Desire
Too Much of a Good Thing?, 79 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 995, 995-1006 (2000).
245 Kerber, supra note 203, at 2; see also Moreau, supra note 96, at 851 (discussing
how "evolutionary theory refutes the neoclassical economic theory's focus on a steady
state of the economic system"). Industries may have multiple equilibria. The speed
with which the market approaches these equilibria may vary over time, and the
equilibria themselves may change because of change in the system itself. The result is
that "equilibrium points in an evolutionary system are rarely actually reached."
Instead, these equilibrium points "serve as an attractor that pulls the system towards
itself for a prolonged period, before giving way to a new attractor." Bart Verspagen, The
Use of Modeling Tools for Policy in Evolutionary Environments, 76 TECHNOLOGICAL
FORECASTING & Soc. CHANGE 453, 455 (2009), available at http://arno.unimaas.nl/
show.cgi?fid=17564.
146 Kerber, supra note 203, at 2.
247 Moreau, supra note 96, at 851.
2
See, e.g., Andrew Healy, Do Firms Have Short Memories?: Evidence from Major
League Baseball, 9 J. SPORTS ECON. 407, 415-18 (2009) (discussing how some
professional baseball teams overweigh, relative to more successful teams, athletes'
recent performance in determining salary).
249 See Linda Argote & Henrich R. Greve, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm-40
Years and Counting: Introduction and Impact, 18 ORG. Sci. 337 (2007) (surveying
impact of Behavioral Theory of the Firm's impact on organizational science research,
including institutional theory and population ecology); Dosi & Marengo, supra note
240, at 491.
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with the uncertainty can vary. 250 Rather than incur costs to
continually process information anew, bounded rational firms (like
consumers) can use rules-of-thumb (heuristics). Firms with better
routines and rules-of-thumb can lower their information
processing costs and secure a competitive advantage. Firms can
improve feedback mechanisms to learn more quickly from their (or
other firms') mistakes. 251 Moreover, firms can identify common
biases and take preventive measures. 252 Consequently, one
important facet of Scenario IV competition is how firms discover
and implement routines to gain a cost advantage.
But if firms become too wedded to existing routines, they face
the risk of competency traps. As industry conditions change, the
firms' existing routines can place them at a competitive
disadvantage. 2 5 3 Under Scenario IV, "In some sense knowledge
depreciates in value over time." 25 4 Thus, another important
dimension of competition is adaptive efficiency, 255 whereby
bounded rational firms update routines to reflect consumers'
changing preferences. 256 Firms compete by continually learning
See Dan Lovallo & Olivier Sibony, The Case for Behavioral Strategy, McKINSEY
Mar. 2010, at 3, available at http://www.veruspartners.net/private/app/
webroot/files/cabelO.pdf (noting recent survey of 2,207 executives where only twentyeight percent said the quality of their companies' strategic decisions was generally
good, sixty percent thought that bad decisions were about as frequent as good ones, and
twelve percent thought good decisions were altogether infrequent).
s51 See John A. List, Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?, 118 Q.J.
ECON. 41 (2003); John A. List, Neoclassical Theory Versus Prospect Theory: Evidence
from the Marketplace, 72 ECONOMETRICA 615, 615 (2004). For example, frequent and
more experienced sports cards traders display less of an endowment effect for sports
cards (such as baseball trading cards) than for other items such as chocolates and
mugs.
252 Camerer & Malmendier, supra note 216, at 269 (noting some of the literature,
investment firms combat loss aversion by having traders switch positions with one
another).
253 Eyal Biyalogorsky et al., Stuck in the Past: Why Managers Persist with New
Product Failures, 70 J. MARKETING 108 (2006) (discussing the "extensive attention in
the literature" to firms' escalation of commitment, which is the tendency of managers
to stay committed to a course of action despite strong negative feedback with respect to
the advisability of this action); Michael & Palandjian, supra note 241, at 270
(discussing literature on competency traps).
254 NORTH, supra note 41, at 323 (discussing uncertainty in a non-ergodic world
(e.g., Scenario IV)).
2s
Id. at 70.
26 Michael & Palandiian, supra note 241, at 275.
250

Q.,
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about customer preferences and competitors' experimentation, and
experimenting themselves with new technologies, routines, and
ways of organizing.
A third important dimension of Scenario IV competition is in
providing bounded rational consumers a better mix of solutions for
their problems. 257 Through their (or monitoring their competitors')
trial-and-error experiments, firms update product offerings to
accommodate consumers' changing preferences. Their ability
depends in part on the feedback loop's efficacy and the competitive
behavior's transparency. 25 8 Alternatively, bounded rational firms
in Scenario IV (as in Scenario II) can seek to mitigate competition
by reducing price transparency and differentiating their products
or services through branding and technological innovation. 259
A fourth important dimension of Scenario IV competition is
the importance of individuality, creativity, and distinctiveness.
Under Scenario I competition, rational individuals are
undifferentiated in motivation. When given the opportunity, they
seek to promote their economic self-interest. Labor is a
commodity, an instrument for providing goods and services, and
can be downsized, outsourced, or automated. 260 There is no
inherent dignity in work or greater social calling to use one's skills
to society's betterment. But as a matter of common experience, the
greater value we see our work as having, the more meaning we
can attribute to our work, and the more engaged and motivated
we will be in our work.2 6 ' Scenario IV's theory of competition
257 See MISES,
supra note 66, at 24 ("[C]ompetition among the various
entrepreneurs is essentially a competition among the various possibilities open to
individuals to remove as far as possible their state of uneasiness by the acquisition of
consumers' goods."); Kerber, supra note 203, at 4.
258 Kerber, supra note 203, at 5.
259 See Illinois ex rel. Burris v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 935 F.2d 1469, 1481 (7th
Cir. 1991) ("Virtually all business behavior is designed to enable firms to raise their
prices above the level that would exist in a perfectly competitive market."); see also
Desai & Waller, supra note 78; Steiner, supra note 38, at 84-85 (discussing price
premium for strong reputation brands).
260 In contrast, the Clayton Act provides that the "labor of a human being is not a
commodity or article of commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2006).
261 DAN ARIELY, THE UPSIDE OF IRRATIONALITY: THE UNEXPECTED BENEFITS OF
DEFYING LOGIC AT WORK AND HOME 66-82 (2010); Jason Krieger, Creatinga Culture of
http://gmj.gallup.com/
2010),
J.
(Oct.
5,
MGMT.
Innovation, GALLUP
(finding that higher levels of
content/143282/creating-culture-innovation.aspx
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helps explain why firms devote significant resources in identifying
and attracting talented workers. It re-introduces moral beliefs of
why we work. 2 6 2 Scenario IV competition enriches our definition of
labor, namely the opportunity to use one's unique gifts to improve
the welfare of others, and thereby express and deepen individual
dignity.
In addition, by developing a unique identity, firms can
promote (or hinder) social, ethical, and moral values that affect
employee behavior; 263 these values in turn can lower the firm's
monitoring costs and increase its competitiveness. 2 64
Scenario IV competition also presents several risks. One risk
is that with bounded rational firms and consumers, traditional
forms of market failure (such as cartels and monopolies) are
likelier in Scenario IV than Scenario I.265 The stronger the
presumption of rationality, the more likely the market will be
efficient, and the less the governmental concern over the
sustained exercise of market power in markets characterized with
low to moderate entry barriers. Consumers can often defeat the
exercise of market power by switching to lower-cost substitutes
offered by other entrants. But as Scenario III discusses with
bounded rational firms, entry does not always occur when rational
choice theory predicts it should. 26 6 Cartels can be more durable
when price-fixers, like the subjects in other behavioral

employee engagement "correlate to more idea sharing, better idea generation, more
creativity in role, and improved business outcomes (on key items, including customer
metrics, productivity, and profitability)").
262 R.H. TAWNEY, THE ACQUISITIVE SOCIETY 33 (2004) ("For what gives meaning to
economic activity, as to any other activity is [ the purpose to which it is directed.").
263 Paul C. Nystrom, Differences in Moral Values Between Corporations, 9 J. BUS.
ETHICS 971, 974 (1990) (survey of how closely-matched corporations within industrial
sectors differed significantly than perceived).
264 GEORGE A. AKERLOF & RACHEL E. KRANTON, IDENTITY ECONOMICS: How OUR
IDENTITIES SHAPE OUR WORK, WAGES, AND WELLBEING 39-59 (2010) (exploring how
workers can abide to shared corporate norms, and lose utility when they put in low
effort; and how job-holders, if they have only monetary rewards and only economic
goals, "will game the system insofar as they can get away with it").
265 See Stucke, Behavioral Economists, supra note 212, at 546-75.
266 See Reeves & Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, supra note 212.
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experiments, are more trustful and cooperative than rational
choice theory predicts. 267
A second risk of Scenario IV competition is new forms of
market failure. In competitive markets, firms identify and
discover ways to solve consumers' problems. 268 But the financial
crisis, Professor Stiglitz wrote, showed how the subprime
mortgage industry worsened, rather than solved, borrowers'
problems. 269 The subprime mortgages increased costs and risks for
consumers while providing mortgage brokers and lenders greater
fees. These products, however, increased risk to the institutions
that acquired the ensuing credit default swaps and collateralized
debt obligations. 270 Among the losers in the financial crisis were
supposedly sophisticated investors who failed to appreciate these
assets' risks. 2 71 Moreover, these financial innovations made
speculation easier. 2 72
A third risk arises from herding. Herding can be beneficial,
as a consumer's utility from a product increases when others use
the product. 273 But herding can pressure consumers to forego the
superior technology for the perceived popular one. 2 7 4 Consumers,
at times, are confronted with competing, incompatible
technologies. In choosing, the consumer wants the technology
platform that others will likely choose, as the more popular
platform (e.g., Windows operating system) will attract more
supporting complements developed for that platform. 275 Each
consumer prefers the superior technology. But believing that

267 See Stucke, Am I a Price-Fixer,supra note 208; Stucke, Behavioral Economists,
supra note 212.
268 Kerber, supra note 203, at 4.
269 STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at 5, 80.
270 See MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010).
271 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 7, at 199; CASSIDY, supra note 86, at 272.
272 See GILLIAN TETT, FOOL'S GOLD: HOW THE BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE AT
J.P. MORGAN WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASHED A
CATASTROPHE (2009); CASSIDY, supra note 86, at 239, 243-50.
273 Marina Lao, Networks, Access, and "Essential Facilities"- From Terminal
Railroadto Microsoft, 62 SMU L. REV. 557, 560-61 (2009).
274 CASSIDY, supra note 86, at 130-31.
275 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 20 (D.D.C. 1999); Case T201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. 11-3601.
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others will opt for the subpar technology, the consumer will choose
the subpar technology and contribute to the suboptimal outcome.
Herding can cause irrational exuberance (or pessimism) over
stocks, real estate, and tulips. 276 As Scenario II discusses, even
rational investors can join (and lead) the herd if they can derive
greater gains from the speculation. Herding can lead to fads,
where a consumer's utility from an item (such as a designer bag)
depends on who else owns the item (either the perceived trendsetters2 77 or masses 278). Herding can increase market turmoil.
When the speculative bubble bursts, the same group of financial
institutions can decide to sell the same group of assets to maintain
their target leverage ratio; this mass selling further depresses the
assets' selling price, prompting the sale of even more assets to deleverage. 279
A fourth risk of Scenario IV competition is industry-specific
market failures. One example is media bias. Historically, antitrust
was concerned about supply-driven media bias. 280 Dominant
media firms provide distorted, self-censored, or biased news
coverage that deviates from the coverage consumers prefer. One
way to reduce supply-driven media bias is to increase the number
of independently-owned competitors, thereby: (i) increasing the
likelihood that the media remain independent when governments
attempt to manipulate the news; (ii) reducing the risk of
information being suppressed or distorted when news providers
have an interest in manipulating consumers' beliefs; and (iii)

276

See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, A SHORT HISTORY OF FINANCIAL EUPHORIA

(1993).
277 See, e.g., THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 25, 33
(Penguin 1994) (1889) (discussing primary motive to accumulate wealth is pecuniary
emulation).
278 See Peter Sheridan Dodds & Duncan J. Watts, Influentials, Networks, and
Public Opinion Formation,34 J. CONSUMER RES. 441, 441-58 (2007).
279 CASSIDY, supra note 86, at 309-10.
280 See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Toward a Better Competition
Policy for the Media: The Challenge of Developing Antitrust Policies That Support the
Media Sector's Unique Role in Our Democracy, 42 CONN. L. REV. 101 (2009); Maurice E.
Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Antitrust and the Marketplace of Ideas, 69 ANTITRUST L.J.
249, 249 (2001).
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driving media firms to invest in providing timely and accurate
coverage. 281
Under Scenario IV, in contrast, more media competition can
increase, rather than reduce, media bias. Bounded rational
consumers can suffer "belief perseverance," whereby they hold
evidence.28 2
disconfirming
notwithstanding
views
their
Consumers search for, and overvalue, news information that
favors their pre-existing cultural outlooks and ideology; they
discount, and are reluctant to search for, information that
contradicts or challenges their pre-existing cultural outlooks and
beliefs. 283 Consumers trade-off the accuracy of a news source for
confirmation of their pre-existing beliefs.2 84 The marketplace of
ideas becomes more fragmented as media outlets increasingly
target specific ideological or political beliefs. The greater
fragmentation of news coverage deprives "societ[ies] of shared
information and experiences, leaving us less able to discuss issues,
less exposed to diverse viewpoints, and more inclined to connect
primarily, or only, with those with whom we agree."28 5 With
greater fragmentation of news coverage, the danger exists that
consumers seek out only those viewpoints with which they already
agree, making reasoned debate more difficult. Accordingly, the
greater danger to democracy, under Scenario IV, is not necessarily
the lack of media competition, but too much competition and the
ensuing demand-driven media bias. 286
281 Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, Competition and Truth in the Market
for News, 22 J. EcON. PERSP. 133, 135-44 (2008).
282 Lee Ross et al., Perseverance in Self-Perception and Social Perception: Biased
Attributional Processes in the Debriefing Paradigm, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 880 (1975).
283 See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 149 (2006).
284 Gentzkow & Shapiro, Market for News, supra note 281, at 144-45.
285 LEE C. BOLLINGER, UNINHIBITED, ROBUST, AND WIDE-OPEN 119 (2010).
286 See, e.g., Stefano DellaVigna & Ethan Kaplan, The Political Impact of Media
Bias, in FACT FINDER, FACT FILTER: How MEDIA REPORTING AFFECTS PUBLIC POLICY
(2008), available at http://elsa.berkeley.edul-sdellavi/wp/mediabiaswb07-06-25.pdf;
Matthew A. Baum & Tim Groeling, New Media & the Polarization of American
Political Discourse, 25 POL. COMMC'N 345 (2008); Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M.
Shapiro, Media, Education and Anti-Americanism in the Muslim World, 18 J. ECON.
PERSP. 117 (2004); Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, What Drives Media Slant?
Evidence from U.S. Daily Newspapers, 78 ECONOMETRICA 35 (2010), available at
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1. Scenario IV's Policy Risks Assuming the Government Is
Rational
If the government is relatively more rational than firms and
consumers, there remains the risk, as in Scenarios II and III, of
authoritarianism and corporate autocracy.
The government, even if more rational, is not omniscient. The
government can predict how it would react (under rational choice
theory). But the government cannot necessarily predict how
bounded rational firms and consumers behave under Scenario
IV.287

One reason why predictions are harder under Scenario IV
lies in the unpredictability of the non-price dimensions of
competition. Heterogeneous firms can be more or less successful in
debiasing, implementing knowledge into developing product or
process innovations, and responding to uncertainty and
consumers' changing tastes. Competitive dynamics can change in
unforeseen ways, as bounded rational firms attempt to
accommodate and adjust to changing consumer preferences. 288
The success of those adjustments and accommodations, in turn,
can depend on further changes by private and public
institutions. 289
Our knowledge of future events ranges between ignorance,
uncertainty, risk, and certainty. Economic life is an adventure,
but not a rollercoaster. Waking up tomorrow, I would not expect
the value of the U.S. stock market to lose about $1.2 trillion, my
employer to close its doors, or my country to default on its debt.
But Black Swan events, Nassim Nicholas Taleb describes, carry
an extreme impact and are outside the realm of regular

http://faculty.chicagobooth.edulmatthew.gentzkow/research/biasmeas.pdf;
Charles S.
Taber & Milton Lodge, Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of PoliticalBeliefs, 50
AM. J. POL. SCI. 755 (2006).
287 See, e.g., Camerer & Fehr, supra note 126, at 50 (distinguishing between
predictions when player strategies are complements (less predictable) and substitutes
(more predictable)).
288 RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF
ECONOMIC CHANGE 370 (1982).
289 See, e.g., NORTH, supra note 41, at 116-26.
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expectations, because nothing in the past can convincingly point to
its possibility. 290
Even for non-Black Swan events, like the price of bagels,
competition can be viewed under Scenarios I and IV. I expect my
bagel shop tomorrow to have the same assortment of bagels (plain,
onion, poppy seed, etc.) and prices as today. Consumer preferences
should not change dramatically overnight. The price, variety, and
quality of bagels should not fluctuate wildly (e.g., two dollar
gourmet bagels on Thursday and seventy-cent plain bagels on
Friday). But my comfort level decreases when trying to forecast
bagel prices over a larger geographic area over a longer time
period. The risk factors for the bagel industry, according to one
public company, include: (i) changes in general economic
conditions and discretionary consumer spending, particularly
spending for meals prepared away from home; (ii) changes in
consumer tastes and preferences, through new diet fads (e.g., lowcarbohydrate diets) or government regulations (e.g., the
prominent disclosure of nutritional and calorie information); (iii)
food safety and reputation for quality; (iv) volatile commodity
prices; (v) weather conditions (including natural disasters);2 9 ' and
(vi) a regional or global health pandemic, which could severely
affect bagel businesses that position themselves as a
"neighborhood atmosphere" where "people can gather for human
connection and high quality food."292 So, if bagel manufacturers
face challenges in predicting and satisfying consumer preferences
over the coming years, so too will competition authorities when
predicting competitive effects in that industry.
Adding to the uncertainty under Scenario IV is path
dependency. Private and government agents' prior choices and
historical experiences can constrain the current choice set. 2 9 3 A
seemingly minor event that happened yesterday in the market can
290 NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY
IMPROBABLE (2007).
291 EINSTEIN NOAH REST. GRP., INC., FORM 10-K ANNUAL REPORT (Feb. 25, 2010),
available at http://www.faqs.org/sec-filings/100225/EINSTEIN-NOAH-RESTAURANT-

GROUP-INC10-K/.
292 Id.
293 NORTH, supra note 41, at 52; TAWNEY, supra note 262, at 28 (observing how
revolutions "are apt to take their color from the regime which they overthrow").

2011]

RECONSIDERING COMPETITION

173

have significant long-term consequences. 2 94 Some industries, like
evolutionary processes generally, are characterized by a degree of
persistence of random events. "Rather than being additive to a
deterministic equilibrium, small random events in evolutionary
processes may accumulate into larger factors that may change the
nature of the system and its history."29 5 Under an evolutionary
economic process, "chance plays a significant role." 296
One example is Microsoft. In the late 1960s, IBM controlled
about seventy percent of the computer market. The Justice
Department challenged IBM's practices, particularly its
"bundling" hardware and software. During the antitrust litigation,
IBM changed course:
Precipitated by a massive antitrust complaint filed against
IBM by the Justice Department in January 1969, the
company reexamined its practices and decided to stop
requiring customers to buy software, services, and hardware
as one bundle in June of the same year. This pricing change
opened up software markets to independent companies. 297
This contributed to the development of the computer software
industry. A decade later, when preparing to launch its personal
computers, the still dominant IBM approached a start-up
company Microsoft about creating a version of a BASIC computer
program. Microsoft suggested that IBM talk to Digital Research,
whose CP/M operating system had become the standard for
computer hobbyists. But here, emotion apparently had a lasting
impact. Digital Research's president reportedly disliked the
arrogant IBM from his university days and was late in meeting
the IBM executives (going flying earlier that day). After the
negotiations stalled, IBM returned to Microsoft to create an
operating system for its personal computer. When introducing its
294 Verspagen, supra note 245, at 6; see also Frank Schweitzer et al., Economic
Networks: The New Challenges, SCI., July 24, 2009, at 422, 423.
295 Verspagen, supra note 245, at 4.
296 Id. at 6; Schweitzer et al., supra note 294, at 423.
297 R. Lougee-Heimer,
The Common Optimization INterface for Operations
Research: Promoting Open-Source Software in the OperationsResearch Community, 47
IBM J. RES. & DEV. 57, 59 (2003) (citing THOMAS J. WATSON, JR., FATHER, SON & Co.:

My LIFE AT IBM & BEYOND (1990)).
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PC, IBM sold the Microsoft operating system for a much lower
price than the CPIM-86 system. 2 9 8 One could inquire what would
have happened if the Justice Department never brought its
antitrust suit against IBM or if Digital Research's president had
not gone flying that day.
Another factor is how randomness interplays with
predictability in scale-free networks.2 99 Scale-free networks are
open. They expand through the continuous addition of new
members to the system, and they exhibit preferential connectivity,
in "that the probability with which a new vertex connects to the
existing vertices is not uniform, [but] there is a higher probability
that it will be linked to a vertex that already has a large number
of connections."30 0 To illustrate this, suppose three antitrust
professors-Amelia, Beatrice, and Clara-start their careers at
similar law schools and their scholarship objectively is of similar
quality. The three professors form links (say collaborate on
research projects) with one another. Their network expands with
each new antitrust law professor. Each new professor must decide
with which existing antitrust professor to collaborate. The new
professors exhibit preferential connectivity, in that they generally
prefer to link with more connected professors. Thus with Amelia,
Beatrice, and Clara, the early rounds are more random: the new
antitrust professor Daniela can decide to link with Amelia,
Beatrice, or Clara. Suppose Daniela randomly decides to
collaborate with Amelia and Clara. Now when new professor Eitel
decides to collaborate, Amelia and Clara have a slight advantage
over Beatrice. Thus, Amelia and Clara can grow in the number of
links, as Beatrice lags behind. As Professor Barabisi observed
with scale-free networks, the rich get richer.30 1 The highly
connected nodes (law professors Amelia and Clara in our example)
acquire more links than the less connected nodes (e.g., Professor
298 See ERIC D. BEINHOCKER, THE ORIGIN OF WEALTH 326-27 (2006); The Rest of
the
Story, THE SCOBLE SHOW (Aug. 8, 2007), http://scobleizer.com/2007/08/08/the-rest-ofthe-story-behind-microsofts-os-deal-with-ibm/.
299 Albert-Ldszl6 Barabasi & R6ka Albert, Emergence of Scaling in Random
Networks, Scl., Oct. 15, 2009, at 509.
300 Id. at 511.
301 See Albert-LAszl6 BarabAsi, Scale-Free Networks: A Decade and Beyond, Scl.,
July 24, 2009, at 412 fig. 1.
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Beatrice), which leads to the emergence of a few highly connected
nodes that become the main hubs for collaboration. Thus, in scalefree networks, one must view the entire process. If one examines
the network only half-way through its formation, one might
assume that the well-connected antitrust professors were
attracting more links because they were better scholars. By then
Amelia and Clara might be better scholars (due to the experience
of collaboration and receiving as a result more information of
current trends). But they reached that success through an element
of luck in the beginning. Likewise, in examining the network only
at its formation, one might assume that the market was
contestable. Each professor has an equal chance of attracting the
next link.
2. Scenario IV's Policy Risks Assuming the Government Is
Bounded Rational
One risk, as in Scenarios II and III, is the bounded rational
government's confirmation bias. The government officials will seek
information that confirms (rather than disconfirms) their theory of
competition (such as the market participants' rationality and
willpower) and discounts or ignores information that challenges
their beliefs. 302 Indeed, regulatory capture is most effective when
the regulators' "share the worldview and the preferences of the
industry they supervise."3 0 3 This was the case with deregulation of
the financial services industry, which began during the Reagan
Administration, 30 4 and accelerated under the Clinton30 5 and
Bush 306 Administrations. One underlying force to this
deregulatory movement was the flawed laissez-faire belief that

302 CASSIDY, supra note 86, at 268-69 (recounting Federal Reserve's belief that
advances in technology have enabled the financial services industry to better manage
the hazards of their business).
303 JOHNSON & KwAK, supra note 7, at 93.
304 Id. at 70-74.
ses Id. at 84, 89, 98-100, 136-44.
306 Id. at 105; PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE
CRISIS OF 2008, 162-64 (2009) (criticizing the Bush Administration's laissez-faire
attitudes); POSNER, supra note 101, at 113, 134-35, 235 (same).
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markets were composed of sophisticated investors, and the
markets accordingly self-correct.307
A second policy risk arises when the bounded rational
government is overconfident in its ability to assess the economic
effects of certain restraints and predict the likely competitive
effects of mergers.3 0 8 Here competition officials do not recognize
that their knowledge depreciates in value over time. They remain
wedded to theories whose premises are no longer valid. They
assume that their economic models still capture the key variables
and that the market dynamics remain largely unchanged since
they last investigated the industry. They assume that they can
accurately predict the future from past experiences (as reflected in
the data).30 9 They do not assess their models' predictive quality.
Antitrust's economic models mostly seek to reduce
uncertainty and simplify. The predicative quality depends in part
on the validity of the models' assumptions. Over the past two
decades, the available market data have increased. Antitrust
enforcers
harnessed market
data to conduct merger
3
1
0
simulations.
Generally, the narrower the product category and
30 See, e.g., JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET: A HISTORY OF RISK,
REWARD, AND DELUSION ON WALL STREET (2009); PRESIDENT'S WORKING GRP. ON FIN.
MKTS., OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES MARKETS AND THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE

ACT
(Nov.
1999),
available at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/finmkts/Documents/otcact.pdf; John Cassidy, Letter from Chicago:After the Blowup, NEW
YORKER, Jan. 11, 2010, at 28; Kenneth M. Davidson, Reality Be Damned: The Legacy of
Chicago School Economics, AM. INT., Nov.-Dec. 2009, at 36, http://www.the-americaninterest.com/article-bd.cfm?piece=693; Paul Krugman, How Did Economists Get It So
Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2009, at 36, 37 (noting that more important than the
economists' failure to predict was "the profession's blindness to the very possibility of
catastrophic failures in [the] market economy"). Thus, deregulating derivatives, under
this flawed worldview, could only reduce, not increase, systemic risk.
308 See, e.g., CASSIDY, supra note 86, at 275-76 (discussing illusion of predictability).
309 NORTH, supra note 41, at 19.
310 See Daniel Hosken et al., Demand System Estimation and Its Application to
HorizontalMerger Analysis 5 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Bureau of Econ., Working Paper No.
246, Apr. 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp246.pdf (discussing
use of scanner data for demand estimation); David Scheffman, Best Practicesfor Data,
and Economics and Financial Analyses in Antitrust Investigations (Apr. 2002)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ftc.govfbe/ftcbebp.pdf (providing
guidelines on economic analysis for meeting with FTC Bureau of Economics); David
Scheffman & Mary Coleman, FTC Perspectives on the Use of Econometric Analyses in
Antitrust Cases 9 (undated) (draft document), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bel
ftcperspectivesoneconometrics.pdf (discussing the use of scanner data for demand
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geographic area studied, the shorter the time horizon, and the less
likely that contingencies and random factors will play a material
role in making outcomes indeterminate.3 11 But as one recent
survey observed, several limitations exist with the current
economic models. 3 12 Data may be unavailable or limited in some
industries, the models' assumptions are invalid, or the models'
neglect non-quantifiable and long-run competitive effects,
including the merger's impact on innovation.3 13 Although merger
simulations can inform antitrust analysis, the U.S. antitrust
agencies wisely "do not treat merger simulation evidence as
conclusive in itself."31 4 With the rise of global trade, we are
trending toward greater uncertainty, where contingencies or
unforeseen factors across the globe (e.g., a string of worker
suicides in Foxconn's factory in Shenzhen, China) can affect
domestic competitors (like Apple) that rely on low-cost labor.31 5
A third risk under Scenario IV arises when the bounded
rational government ignores non-quantifiable and long-run
competitive effects, such as systemic risk. The government
discounts or ignores evidence that its economic theory cannot

estimation and other relevant economic analyses); see also FED. TRADE COMM'N & U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 6, 8, 9, 14

(Mar. 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/215247.pdf
(describing use of scan data to estimate demand elasticities for branded consumer
products).
311 NORTH, supra note 41, at 20-22. For example, suppose two leading
manufacturers of white pan bread decide to merge. Using retailers' historic in-store
scan data, econometricians can examine what impact changes in the retail price of one
brand, such as Wonder white pan bread, had on the unit sales of other branded or
private label products, such as rye bread, bagels, or wheat bread. Using the scan data
for white pan bread purchases in a specific market, such as Chicago, an econometrician
may predict accurately the price of white bread shortly after the merger. But predicting
bread prices across the United States (or globally) over a longer time period invites
uncertainty as unforeseen events may affect demand, such as diet fads or supply.
312 See Oliver Budzinski & Isabel Ruhmer, Merger Simulation in Competition
Policy:A Survey, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 277 (2009).
a3

Id.

HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 61, at 21.
316 Kathrin Hille, Foxconn to Shift Some of Apple Assembly, FIN. TIMES, June 29,
314

2010,
at
1, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/2429f498-82fd-lldf-8bl500144feabdcO.html#axzzlYjzSEEJ1.
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explain, or scenarios that its theory does not contemplate.3 1 6 The
financial services industry during the 1990s and early 2000s, for
example, underwent a mega-merger wave.31 7 As a Department of
Justice official noted, "[A] number of individual mergers during
the 1990s ranked among the largest U.S. bank mergers ever, in
terms of the real value of assets involved, and in terms of the
share of total U.S. bank assets accounted for by the merging
banks."3 18 The financial sector was becoming more concentrated,
and its profits were growing faster.3 1 9 One mega-merger was
between The Travelers Group, Inc. and Citicorp. The $70 billion
merger created the world's largest commercial banking
organization, with total consolidated assets of approximately $751
billion. 320 During its merger review, the Justice Department
"heard numerous complaints that Citigroup would have an undue
aggregation of resources-that the deal would create[] a firm too
big to be allowed to fail."3 2 But the Department "essentially
viewed this as primarily a regulatory issue to be considered by the
[Federal Reserve Board]."3 22 The financial services industry was
becoming more concentrated as a consequence of the merger wave
among large financial institutions. 323 But the DOJ never
316 See, e.g., CASSIDY, supra note 86, at 221-34 (discussing Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan's failure to take seriously the concept of market failure).
317 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 7, at 84-85. JPMorgan Chase, for example, was
the result of mergers with "Chemical Bank and Manufacturers Hanover (1991), First
Chicago and National Bank of Detroit (1995), Chemical and Chase Manhattan (1996),
Bank One and First Chicago (1998), J.P. Morgan and Chase Manhattan (2000), and
JPMorgan Chase and Bank One (2004)." Id.
318 Robert Kramer, Chief, Litigation II Section, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
"Mega-Mergers" in the Banking Industry, Address at the American Bar Associate
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/
Antitrust Section (Apr. 14, 1999),
public/speeches/214845.htm.
319 JOHNSON & KwAK, supra note 7, at 85.
320 Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd., Order for Travelers Group and Citicorp
Approving Formation of a Bank Holding Company and Notice to Engage in
Nonbanking Activities, (Sept. 23, 1998) [hereinafter Fed. Reserve Citicorp Order],
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/BHC/1998/19980923/1998
0923.pdf.
321 Kramer, supra note 318, at 6 (emphasis added).
322

Id.

Kenneth D. Jones & Tim Critchfield, Consolidation in the U.S. Banking
Industry: Is the "Long, Strange Trip" About to End?, FDIC BANKING REV. (Jan. 19,
323

2006),

available

at

http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2006jan/article2/
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considered systemic risk or how creating a firm too-big-andintegral-to-fail could distort competition. Its economic models
mainly considered short-term price effects arising from the
merger, namely whether Citicorp-Travelers, post-merger, could
raise the price of its services in narrowly defined geographic
markets. 324 In limiting its risk assessment to short-term price
effects, the government can fail to see or consider the merger's
impact on the efficiency, competitiveness, and stability of the
overall financial system.
The financial markets, when viewed as a complex adaptive
system, can become more vulnerable as one bank increases in size
and becomes too-big-and-integral-to-fail. 325 This is not always
apparent. During relatively calm periods, having large financial
institutions can appear beneficial. If a peripheral bank is subject
to a random shock, the network's health remains stable. Indeed,
the larger banks may be credited for absorbing the shock. 326 "It is
only when the hub-a large or connected financial institution-is
subject to stress that network dynamics will be properly
unearthed," said a Bank of England executive. "When large

index.html ("Over the two decades 1984-2003, the structure of the U.S. banking
industry indeed underwent an almost unprecedented transformation-one marked by a
substantial decline in the number of commercial banks and savings institutions and by
a growing concentration of industry assets among a few dozen extremely large financial
institutions."). Between year-end 1984 and 2003, the number of banking and thrift
organizations declined almost forty-eight percent from 15,084 to 7,842. Id. Mergers and
acquisition accounted for most of this increased concentration. Id.
324 The DOJ does not generally challenge mergers between firms dominant in
different markets (for example, a bank dominant in the western United States merges
with a dominant bank in the eastern United States). Kramer, supra note 318, at 7
(noting how the NationsBank and Bank of America mega-merger "was a classic market
extension merger since NationsBank's operations focused generally on the east coast
and south and Bank of America was largely on the west coast" so the merger's
competitive issues for the DOJ involved only two states-New Mexico and Texas).
325 Thomas J. Horton, The Coming Extinction of Homo Economicus and the Eclipse

of the Chicago School of Antitrust: Applying Evolutionary Biology to Structural and
Behavioral Antitrust Analyses, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 469 (2011) (an evolutionary biology
perspective on why large economic concentrations, such as monopolies and oligopolies,
are vastly overrated in terms of their overall efficiency and positive impacts on our
economic system, and how the Chicago School underrates their dangerous impacts).
326 CASSIDY, supra note 86, at 283 (recounting Greenspan's praise of large
systemically important banks' use of credit derivatives to stabilize the banking
system).
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financial institutions came under stress during this crisis, these
327
adverse system-wide network dynamics revealed themselves."
Even if the government acknowledges systemic risks, the
risks are often harder to quantify and thus easier to ignore. Under
a total welfare analysis, the competition authority assesses a
merger's risks (and costs) over the short-term (including its
impact on consumer and producer surplus) and long-term
(including its effect on the network's resilience). 328 Assessing the
merger's short-term static price effects (e.g., whether the banks
post-merger can raise rates for specific categories of borrowers) is
often easier than assessing and quantifying the merger's longterm impact on the efficiency, competitiveness, and stability of the
overall financial network. But if the government ignores the
mega-merger's risks to the overall financial network's resilience,
the merger analysis is incomplete and potentially flawed. This
risk is compounded when the bounded rational government,
overconfident that its merger analysis identifies all the significant
anticompetitive risks, goes beyond approving mega-mergers that
are viewed as market extensions (despite the long-term risks
these mergers may pose) and seeks to dismantle any restraints on
future industry concentration.3 29
327 Andrew G Haldane, Executive Director, Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., Rethinking
the Financial Network 11, Address at the Financial Student Association, Amsterdam
(Apr. 2009), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/
speech386.pdf.
328 Sally J. Goerner et al., Quantifying Economic Sustainability: Implications for
Free-Enterprise Theory, Policy and Practice, 69 ECOLOGICAL EcoN. 76, 77 (2009);
Howard A. Shelanski, Enforcing Competition During an Economic Crisis, 77
ANTITRUST L.J. 229, 239-45 (2010).
329 In the Citicorp/Travelers merger, a "significant number of other commenters"
told the Federal Reserve that the merger violated the Glass-Steagall Act; they "urged
the Board not to consider the proposal unless and until Congress amends the law to
allow unlimited combinations of insurance, banking and securities businesses." Fed.
Reserve Citicorp Order, supra note 320, at 6. Travelers CEO Sanford Weill hoped his
mega-merger would push Congress to remove the barriers under the Glass-Steagall
Act. The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: FinancialPowerhouse (PBS television broadcast
Apr. 7, 1998), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bblbusiness/jan-june98/
merger_4-7.html. Congress did so a year later with the Gramm-Leach-Bilely Act of
1999. The 1999 law repealed the Glass-Steagall Act's restrictions on bank and
securities-firm affiliations, and amended the Bank Holding Company Act to permit
affiliations among financial services companies, including banks, securities firms and
N.Y.TIMES.COM,
(1933),
Act
Glass-Steagall
companies.
insurance
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A fourth risk under Scenario IV is when a bounded rational
government is overconfident in its ability to regulate firms deemed
too-big-and-integral-to-fail. For example, commenters warned the
Federal Reserve Board that the Citicorp-Travelers mega-merger
"would result in an undue concentration of resources and in an
organization that is both 'too big to fail' and 'too big to
supervise."'3 30 But in permitting the merger, the Federal Reserve
responded that the nation's largest corporate merger "would have
a de minimis effect on competition."33 1 The Federal Reserve
rejected the argument that the absolute or relative size of Citicorp
would adversely affect the market structure. 332 It failed to see how
"the size or breadth of Citicorp's activities would allow it to distort
or dominate any relevant market."33 3 Finally, the Federal
Reserve, with its "extensive experience supervising Citicorp,"
confidently stated that it "developed a comprehensive, risk-based
supervision plan" to effectively monitor Citibank; moreover, other
government agencies, like the Securities and Exchange
Commission, would "assist the Board in understanding Citigroup's
business and the risk profiles of those businesses." 334
As the merger played out over the next decade, Citigroup
senior management and the government demonstrated their poor
understanding of the risk profiles of the collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) business. 3 3 5 In 2008, Citibank, and other
financial institutions considered too-big-and-integral-to-fail, were
(or were perceived to be) failing and received an implicit

http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/subjects/g/glass-steagall-act_193
3/index.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
330 Fed. Reserve Citicorp Order, supra note 320, at 74.
331 Id. at 75.
332 Id. at 85.
333

Id. at 86.

334

Id.

335 After Citigroup senior executives testified before the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission investigators on the cause of Citigroup's 2008 bailout, the Commission's
Chairman, Phil Angelides, said, "One thing that is striking is the extent to which
senior management either didn't know or didn't care to know about risks that
ultimately helped bring the institution to its knees." Bradley Keoun et al., Citigroup

"Liquidity Puts" Draw Scrutiny from Crisis Inquiry, BLOOMBERG, Apr. 13, 2010,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-04-13/citigroup-s-14-billion-liquidity-put-loss-isfocus-of-u-s-crisis-panel.html.
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government guarantee. Citigroup, an early recipient of the
government bailout, received a $45 billion emergency infusion and
$301 billion of government asset insurance, which was the largest
taxpayer bailout for any U.S. bank.336
3. Policy Alternatives under Scenario IV
Given Scenario IV's competitive dynamics, one could argue
that the government cannot accurately predict the merger's likely
competitive effects. Accordingly, the government should abstain
from predictions and challenge only those consummated mergers
where significant anticompetitive effects have manifested.3 3 7 But
waiting post-merger for anticompetitive effects can foreclose
effective relief (one reason why Congress facilitated pre-merger
review).33 8
Moreover, bounded rationality differs from ignorance. At
times, the problems are apparent. One need not be a Homo
336 See
Where is the Money?: Eye
on the Bailout, PROPUBLICA,
http://bailout.propublica.org/entities/96-citigroup (last visited Nov. 1, 2011); see also
CASSIDY, supra note 86, at 330 (noting that although politically unpalatable to the
Bush Administration, nationalizing Citibank might have been cheaper than insuring
its toxic assets); Keoun et al., supra note 335.
331 See, e.g., General Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846, 863 (5th Cir.
1971) ("In a complex and dynamic industry such as the communications field, it cannot
be expected that the agency charged with its regulation will have perfect clairvoyance. .
. . 'Hardship must at times result from postponement of the rule of action till a time
when action is complete. It is one of the consequences of the limitations of the human
intellect and of the denial to legislators and judges of infinite prevision."' (quoting
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 145 (1921))).
338 Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2006);
United States v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., Civ. Action No. 01-02062(GK), 2002 WL
31961456 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2002) (discussing policies underlying the pre-merger
notifications requirements of the HSR Act); see also T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v.
Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. 11-3601, 2007 WL 2693858 ("If the Commission were required to
wait until competitors were eliminated from the market, or until their elimination was
sufficiently imminent, before being able to take action under Article 82 EC, that would
clearly run counter to the objective of that provision, which is to maintain undistorted
competition in the common market and, in particular, to safeguard the competition
that still exists on the relevant market."); Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecution by
Regulation: The Changing Nature of Antitrust Enforcement Case, 77 OR. L. REV. 1383,
1397-98 (1998). After the merger, employees may leave the company, manufacturing
plants may have closed, the former competitors' goods and services may be a shadow of
their former competitive might, and the merged entities' operations may be so
integrated that structural remedies are impractical.
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Economicus to see America's obesity problem. A bounded rational
government can assist consumers', firms', and its own learning
processes by improving the feedback loop. The government can
disseminate information of market participants' trial-and-error
experiments, and assist participants in integrating and applying
that knowledge. Advances in telecommunications, for example,
have helped farmers in India to not only learn the latest crop
prices but to also increase their yields and efficiencies by learning
from researchers' and other farmers' lessons through trial-anderror.3 39 Farmers use cell phones to learn how to use less seed,
fuel, and fertilizers, while reaping bigger harvests. 340
The government can also opt for structural safeguards to
promote industry diversity and stability. As the U.S. government
found after the financial crisis, "[r]estrictions on future growth by
acquisition of the largest financial companies ultimately will
prevent acquisitions that could make these firms harder for their
officers and directors to manage, for the financial markets to
understand and discipline, and for regulators to supervise." 341
On the one hand, systemic risk is not limited to highly
concentrated markets. Small bounded rational banks can
similarly ignore their activities' riskiness. 34 2 Several bank failures
can have a cascading effect when banks respond similarly to
cripple the banking system. 343 On the other hand, a larger, more
diverse pool, while susceptible to herding, "leads to a higher
probability that in the case of an exogenous shock one of these
solution." 3 44
appropriate
an
provide
will
technologies
Consequently, perhaps the best recipe for confronting uncertainty
339 Richard Stone, News: Dialing Up Knowledge-And Harvests, SC., Feb. 12, 2010,
at 808.
340

341

Id.

FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, STUDY & RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING
CONCENTRATION LIMITS ON LARGE FINANCIAL COMPANIES (Jan. 2011), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/Study%20on%2OConcentration%20Limi
ts%20on%20Large%2OFirms%2001-17-11.pdf (discussing benefits of the concentration
limits under section 622 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act).
342 Indeed, rational banks may engage in risky behavior or risk the erosion of their
stock price over the short-term.
34
Schweitzer et al., supranote 294, at 424-25; STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at 149.
"4 Kerber, supra note 203, at 9.
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and systematic risk is maintaining diversity and "institutions that
permit trial and error experiments to occur." 3 4 5
Ultimately, a key issue under Scenario IV is one of
institutional design. Does the government have sufficient
incentive to recognize its bounded rationality, to continually learn
and update its beliefs, and to update its policies accordingly? One
impediment the government faces is the behavioral bias of belief
perseverance'. Confident in the predictive quality of its
competition policies, the government may argue that there is no
need to empirically test whether its predictions are indeed
accurate; it also ignores or discounts competitive behavior that its
economic theories cannot explain.
A second impediment is incentives. Bounded rational firms at
least have an incentive to improve their rationality and willpower
when debiasing provides a competitive advantage. The
government lacks this incentive. At times, competition agencies
compete for prestige, resources, and cases (such as the Federal
Trade Commission and the Justice Department over mergers).
But inter-agency competition does not necessarily increase
political accountability that reduces biases and heuristics.34 6 The
competition agency may attract inquisitive dynamic leaders who
want to critically test the economic theory's assumptions. But
others in government will likely resist. This critical assessment
diverts staff and funding from immediate prosecutions.
Prosecutions bring publicity, which the agency uses to justify its
existence. The rewards from institutional learning accrue over the
long-term, often after the political appointees leave office.
Moreover, some economic experts and lawyers whose livelihood
depends on rational choice theory (and firms that benefit from
these antitrust policies) will discourage such empiricism as a
waste of time and resources. Consequently, government
institutions often lack sufficient incentives to continually test

345

LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN

INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 11 (2d ed. 2006) (unconcentrated markets reduce the risk of
costly error); NORTH, supra note 41, at 163.
346 When test subjects were expected to defend their judgments to their peers,
subjects chose more complex and time-consuming decision-making strategies. Ziva
Kunda, The Casefor Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 481 (1990).
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their assumptions, to retrospectively examine the efficacy of their
actions, and to use these findings to update their policies. 347
Competition agencies need patient gardeners, who
experiment, monitor, and update the economic theories. But
structural mechanisms are needed to ensure that the agencies
hire and support these gardeners who tend to antitrust policy.
One mechanism is to increase the government's accountability.
This can be done directly, as in the European Union, where the
European Commission's inaction (e.g., not enjoining a merger) can
be challenged in court. But this assumes that the court will strike
the right balance in deference.
A second mechanism is to require the competition agencies to
explain why they did not challenge mergers, subject to extended
review. 348 The competition agency should explain each critical
assumption it made in determining that the merger was unlikely
to lessen competition. 349 The agencies should be required to
undertake and publish more post-merger reviews, to test whether
these assumptions indeed were valid. At times, enforcement
actions lead to undesirable outcomes. High criminal fines can
hamper competition. Divestitures of assets, as part of merger
review, may later prove inadequate. Behavioral remedies may
unintentionally lead to anticompetitive results.3 50 Subjecting the
NORTH, supra note 41, at 68.
The U.S. competition agencies at times issue closing statements, but the analysis
can vary considerably. Compare Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Statement of the
Federal Trade Commission Concerning Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.IP&O Princess
Cruises plc and Carnival Corporation/P&O Princess Cruises plc, FTC File No. 021 0041
(Oct. 4, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/10/cruisestatement.htm, with
Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Statement of the Department of Justice's
Antitrust Division on Its Decision to Close Its Investigation of the Merger of Delta Air
Lines Inc. and Northwest Airlines Corporation, Oct. 29, 2008, available at
http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/2008/October/08-at-963.html.
349 If the agency believes that the merger is anticompetitive, but feels that it would
lose in court, the agency should say so. Otherwise, the courts and Congress will be
unaware of the unintended consequences their current legal standard is causing.
350 For example, making price information public may make collusion easier. See
Maurice E. Stucke, Evaluating the Risks of Increased Price Transparency, 19 SPRING
OECD's
ANTITRUST 81 (2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=927417;
347

348

DIRECTORATE FOR FIN., FISCAL AND ENTER. AFFAIRS, COMM. ON COMPETITION LAW &
POLICY, COMPETITION POLICY ROUNDTABLE: PRICE TRANSPARENCY 205-09 (Sept. 11,

2001), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/63/2535975.pdf (discussing benefits
and detriments of price transparency in the United Kingdom).
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competition agencies' actions to external review and criticism,
such ex post review, would require greater accountability by those
entrusted with enforcing the antitrust laws.
Third, the competition authorities should periodically
commission empirical research to test the continuing validity of
the assumptions underlying their policies. The government
agencies "have the ability to study over time how individuals
behave in certain settings,"3 5 which is exactly what the U.K.'s
Office of Fair Trading is doing with pricing frames. 35 2
CONCLUSION
To design better competition policies, we need to understand
the limits of our current policies. Thus, as the Chicago School
recognized, defining competition and the goals of competition law
are paramount. This is because "[e]verything else follows from the
answer we give."353 Going forward, competition authorities must
first reevaluate their theory of competition. As this article shows,
no satisfactory definition of competition exists. Some consider
competition as an idealized end-state (such as static price
competition under the economic model of perfect competition);
others view competition as a dynamic process.
Any theory of competition will depend on its premises.
Altering one set of assumptions (rationality of firms and
consumers) expands the current theories of competition into the
frontiers of Scenarios II, III, and IV. Altering the assumption of
the government's relative rationality adds additional policy
concerns.
One cannot understand competition deductively from the
assumption of rational market participants with perfect
willpower. Nor can one assume that every market is confined to
351 Rosch, Next Challenges, supra note 63, at 17.
352

See OFFICEOF FAIR TRADING, supra note 135.

353 BORK, supra note 8, at 50. Not surprisingly, Bork, in his paradigm-shifting book,

the ANTITRUST PARADOX, first defined competition, then outlined his goals of
competition law, from which his legal standards to achieve these goals arose. After
rejecting the definitions of competition as rivalry, perfect competition ("utterly useless
as a goal of law"), and protection of fragmented markets, Bork settled on his definition
of competition, namely as "a shorthand of expression of consumer welfare," which in
turn comported with his goal of competition law. Id. at 57-61.
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one scenario. In markets with sophisticated participants dealing
in homogenous goods where price rather than innovation is key,
competition can resemble Scenario I. Other markets can resemble
Scenario IV, where "competition is a method for solving knowledge
problems through a trial and error process." 354 Nor are industries
confined to one scenario. Industries can originate in Scenario IV
when uncertainty exists over consumers' preferences and how the
new technology benefits consumers. 5 Various experimental
designs are at play until through trial-and-error (or network
effects) a dominant design emerges. As the industry matures,
consumers and manufacturers experiment less, variety decreases,
and competition turns more on price. 356
Competition is better understood inductively through
empirical research. In analyzing competition under the frontiers of
Scenarios II, III, and IV, policymakers will see beyond static price
competition in narrowly defined antitrust markets. Issues of
systemic risk, behavioral exploitation, herding behavior, and
overconfidence bias will increase in importance. Antitrust analysis
accordingly will shift from narrowly defined markets to vertical
and horizontal competition among larger units, systems,
platforms, and alliances in which potential competition plays an
important analytical role.
Going forward, there will unlikely be any unifying definition
of competition. Competition, like any complex system, is
incompressible, in that it is "impossible to account for the system
in a manner that is less complex than the system itself."3 57 Once
policymakers relax the premises of their theories of competition,
they will encounter greater complexity. They will increasingly

Kerber, supranote 203, at 5.
Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, Evolutionary Theorizing in Economics,
16 J. EcoN. PERSP. 23, 35 (2002).
356 Grant Miles et al., Industry Variety & Performance, 14 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 163,
167 (1993) (discussing product life cycle); BEINHOCKER, supra note 298, at 254-57;
Nelson & Winter, supra note 355, at 36.
157 Organisation for Econ. Co-operation and Dev., A Framework to Measure the
Progress of Societies: Statistics Directorate 13 n.8 (OECD Statistics Working Paper
Series, Paper No 34, July 12, 2010), available at http://www.politiquessociales.net/
IMG/pdflframework.pdf.
354
35
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perceive competition as an often unpredictable, dynamic process,
not easily subject to mathematical modeling.
One might ask whether defining competition, given the
complexities, is necessary. But one cannot understand what goals
are achievable from a competition policy, unless one better
comprehends how competition works. And one cannot understand
competition, if one relies on a flawed assumption of rationality.
Consequently, the first order is to understand how
competition works in particular industries and to reevaluate the
premises of our theory of competition, including the rationality of
the market participants and the interplay among government
institutions and informal social, ethical, and moral norms.
Although competition agencies are increasingly sharing market
studies,35 8 this remains competition policy's weakness.35 9
In revisiting their theory of competition, including the
underlying assumptions, competition authorities should look
beyond antitrust's current neoclassical economic theories and
consider the developments in several inter-disciplinary fields, such
as behavioral economics, new institutional economics, and
evolutionary economics. The literature can provide a richer
understanding of the observed marketplace behavior, how
consumers choose, and additional remedial options, including
default options. Ultimately, these interdisciplinary economic
theories can improve antitrust analysis by helping us understand
first, what competition is; second, what competition can achieve
for us; and third, how competition can promote the good life.

358 Int'l Competition Network, Market Studies Good Practice Handbook (ICN
Advocacy (Market Studies Project) Working Group, Apr. 2010), available at
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc646.pdf.
>>Kerber, supra note 203, at 6 ("no serious theoretical and empirical economic
research" has been undertaken about Hayek's concept of competition as a discovery
procedure).

